The High Court has scrutinised the validity of a Declaration of Trust and the enforcement of charging orders. Wade v Singh sheds light on the intricate balance between property rights, trust law, and creditor protection in an insolvency. The case, centered around a property known as "the Oaks," involved the liquidators of MSD Cash & Carry Plc (in liquidation) seeking to enforce charging orders against properties owned by various family members involved in the business to satisfy a significant judgment debt.
Background of the Case
And so, we continue the tale with the TIBs now triumphantly holding both the hard-won exequatur which expressly recognised the bankruptcy order and Trustee in Bankruptcy (TIB) and confirmed that all rights and powers were enforceable in France and judgment of the French criminal court which restored the seized criminal assets to the TIBs under the vesting provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986. However, there were still clear and untested differences to obtaining automatic recognition under the EU Regulation on Insolvency proceedings (as Recast) (RIR).
11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2) provides (emphasis added):
- “(c) . . . the condition that a plan be fair and equitable . . . includes . . . (2) . . . all of the projected disposable income of the debtor to be received in the 3-year period, or such longer period not to exceed 5 years as the court may fix, . . . will be applied to make payments under the plan.”
There is little-to-no guidance in the Bankruptcy Code on what “as the court may fix” might mean. So, that meaning is left to the courts to decide.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), an individual debtor may be denied a discharge, in its entirely, for making a transfer “with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” a creditor or the trustee.
On April 17, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court for Eastern Michigan ruled:
A “silent” creditor in Subchapter V is one who does not vote on the debtor’s plan and does not object to that plan. The “silent” creditor is a problem for Subchapter V cases.
The Problem
Here’s the problem:
Here are a couple discharge-related bankruptcy questions I’ve heard of late, along with an answer.
Question 1. Why are individuals, but not corporations, eligible for a Chapter 7 discharge?
- §727(a)(1) says, “the court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless—(1) the debtor is not an individual” (emphasis added).
Question 2. Why are individuals, but not corporations, subject to § 523(a) discharge exceptions in Chapter 11?
Can non-compete and confidentiality protections in a rejected franchise agreement be discharged in bankruptcy?
The answer is, “No,” according to In re Empower Central Michigan, Inc.[Fn. 1]
Facts
Debtor is an automotive repair shop.
Debtor operates under a Franchise Agreement with Autolab Franchising, LLC. The Franchise Agreement has a non-compete provision, and there is a separate-but-related confidentiality agreement.
The continuing effort in Congress to extend Subchapter V’s $7.5 million debt limit recently hit a snag. The result: the $7.5 million debt limit for Subchapter V eligibility expired on June 21, 2024, and the Subchapter V debt limit is now reduced to an inflation-adjusted $3,024,725.[i]
The phrase “Texas Two-Step,” as used in bankruptcy, is a legal expletive. Regardless of what the details of a Texas Two-Step might be, the phrase has become synonymous with:
- abusive behavior;
- bad faith conduct;
- a means for swindling creditors;
- the antithesis of “doing what’s right”;
- a tool for avoiding liability;
- etc., etc.
Describing a legal tactic as a “Texas Two-Step” is like calling that tactic a “#$&*#%R&” or “#*$&.” It’s a legal expletive that means “really, really bad.”
Here’s a dilemma:
- Should bankruptcy be available as a tool for resolving mass tort cases of all types (like it already is in asbestos contexts)?
Here’s an illustration of the dilemma:
- many tort claimants in the Johnson & Johnson case DO NOT want bankruptcy involved; but
- many tort claimants in the Purdue Pharma case were BEGGING the courts to approve the bankruptcy plan.
How do we solve this dilemma?