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Press reports are crowded with headlines about the rise in commercial bankruptcy filings, which increased yet again this year.1 High interest rates, inflation, delayed effects of COVID, and huge corporate debt contributed to the jump in corporate insolvency filings. More are anticipated.

Judgment and award creditors often fret that US courts are unfriendly and the tools to unravel complicated asset protection schemes are inadequate. In an encouraging ruling refuting this sentiment, the Southern District of New York recently reiterated its endorsement for reverse veil piercing as a remedy for unsatisfied judgment creditors seeking to hold corporate entities responsible for judgment liabilities of shareholders and directors.

One of the significant risks that creditors weigh when deciding whether to lend money is bankruptcy risk: can the borrower use the bankruptcy laws to discharge the debt or compel the creditor to accept less than it bargained for? In the sovereign debt market, it has been an article of faith for creditors that states cannot file for bankruptcy and obtain such relief. But a recent ruling from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York—Hamilton Reserve Bank v.

Mac Interiors Limited (the Company), a Northern Ireland-incorporated company, has become the first company incorporated outside the Irish State (and the EU) to have an examiner appointed under the examinership regime provided for in section 509 of the Companies Act 2014 (the 2014 Act).

What does it mean to own something? When should the law acknowledge that somebody really owns something, even if they don't formally own it?

And when will courts recognize the economic reality that one person — say, a judgment debtor — in truth owns something, notwithstanding that person's painstaking efforts to keep formal legal title in the hands of others?

The law has long recognized doctrines to disregard the existence, or pierc the veil, of corporate entities to which a debtor has transferred assets.

The European Union (Preventive Restructuring) Regulations 2021 (the Regulations) were signed into law in Ireland on 27 July 2022. The Regulations provide for the transposition of the mandatory articles of Directive (EU) 2019/1023 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt (the Directive).

On 27 July 2022, the European Union (Preventive Restructuring) Regulations 2022 (S.I. 380/2022) (the Regulations) amended the Irish Companies Act 2014 (the Act) by transposing certain requirements of Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 (the Directive) not already provided for in Irish law.

This has resulted in a number of modifications to the examinership regime and, for the first time, a codification of directors' duties when companies are in the `zone of insolvency'.

The changes to the Examinership regime include:

As 21st century disputes take on an increasingly cross-border character, so, too have parties resorted to a powerful tool provided to non-U.S. litigants under American law -- petitions to take discovery pursuant to Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 1782.

While many have focused on the question of whether private international arbitrations can support Section 1782 petitions, case law has evolved on another question: Can Section 1782 be used by litigants seeking to identify property to satisfy judgments rendered in non-U.S. proceedings?

What role might dispute funding play in a complex cross-border dispute involving multiple jurisdictions in Latin America?

A recent Fifth Circuit decision released on December 7 sends a clear message to those seeking to challenge a trustee’s litigation funding agreement: you’d better be on solid ground when it comes to “standing.”

In the five-page opinion authored by Judge Jacques L. Weiner, Jr., the court found that the appellant-debtor in In re Dean lacked standing to challenge a funding agreement approved by a Texas Bankruptcy Court. The Fifth Circuit found that the debtor was not “directly, adversely, and financially impacted” by the funding agreement or the bankruptcy court’s order.