The High Court of Australia in CGU Insurance Ltd v Blakeley & Ors [2016] HCA 2 unanimously confirmed that a third party can join a defendant’s insurer to a proceeding and seek a declaration of rights under the insurance agreement, provided that third party has a ‘real interest’ in the performance of the agreement and that there is practical utility in the court providing that declaration.

So-called “Creditor Portals”, and other similarly titled electronic platforms by which insolvency practitioners typically circulate any meaningful information to creditors about insolvent estates, have been a bugbear of mine ever since they were first used a little while ago. Don’t get me wrong; I absolutely applaud the attempt which they represent to minimise the amount of unnecessary paperwork circulating around the country and the savings of cost which they bring to the administration of insolvent estates where the cost of copying and posting alone would be absolutely frightening today.

In a written statement this morning from Lord Faulks QC, Minister of State for Civil Justice, the government has announced that, from April 2016, insolvency litigation will no longer be exempt from what have been abbreviated to “the LASPO reforms”.

Regular readers of my blogs over the years will know that I never pass up a chance to use a musical analogy for business problems. As an insolvency lawyer with a second calling treading the boards, my legal practice and my music frequently vie for my attention: never more so than during the Christmas season.

Today, by a majority of 3-2, the High Court of Australia in Commissioner of Taxation v Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd (in liq) [2015] HCA 48 confirmed that s 254(1)(d) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA 1936) does not impose an obligation on trustees (including administrators, receivers and liquidators) to retain sufficient moneys from the trust fund to pay tax unless a relevant assessment has been issued.

The Turnbull Government’s much-heralded ‘Innovation Statement’ was released yesterday. It contained wide-ranging statements on reforms aimed at fostering innovation across a number of sectors in the Australian economy.

One important reform area is in Australian corporate insolvency law.

Corporate insolvency law reform timetable

The Innovation Statement includes important content for the reform of Australia’s corporate insolvency laws. It is part of an ongoing reform exercise which has followed this timetable to date:

I am often asked “what do you do”? If I reply “a regulatory solicitor”, this inevitably elicits a blank expression from the enquirer (be that a non-lawyer or lawyer), so I go on to the more long-winded version, that I am a criminal solicitor who advises business owners and other stakeholders on how to stay on the right side of the criminal law, and defends them when they get it wrong.

Consider this situation: a dispute has arisen between two parties in relation to an agreement which is subject to an arbitration clause. Separately, a winding up application has been made against one of the parties to the arbitration in the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated. An arbitral award is obtained against the potentially insolvent company. That company has assets in Hong Kong, against which the creditor is now seeking to enforce their rights.

It was far from a secret that a veritable smorgasbord of phased changes to insolvency law were coming in on 1 October. The legal and insolvency press has been riddled with it, and frankly the flavours were all a bit predictable. The commentators falling over themselves to ask mundane questions such as “are you ready for…?” and “what will happen now…?” are really just asking “we are really up to date on the new law, aren’t we brilliant?”; of course you are, but you’re not getting any marks for originality.

The unanimous decision by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Templeton v Australian and Securities Investments Commission [2015] FCAFC 137 confirms that the concept of proportionality is a well-recognised factor in considering the question of reasonable remuneration for an insolvency practitioner, and that, in assessing a remuneration claim, the Court can take into account the quality and complexity of the work as well as the value and nature of any property dealt with and the time reasonably spent.