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Bouwen met vertrouwen: insolventie-gerelateerde aandachtspunten voor opdrachtgevers in bouwcontracten

The current market conditions of the construction and project development sector may prompt extra attention to insolvency-related safeguards in building contracts with (sub)contractors. Aiming to mitigate insolvency risks as much as possible, in this blog we discuss a few key considerations for principals to take into account when entering into building contracts with (sub)contractors.

Building with confidence: insolvency-related considerations for principals in building contracts

Even if the statutory conditions for cramming down the votes of dissenting creditors has been met, the court retains a discretion to consider other factors

Certain statutory conditions need to be met in order for the court to sanction a plan at least one class of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) – referred to as the "cross-class cram down".

For a foreign decree to be recognisable in Switzerland, it is according to the Swiss International Private Law Act, required that the foreign bankruptcy decree is enforceable in the state where it was issued, and there must not be any grounds for refusing recognition, e.g. a violation of Swiss public policy. Furthermore, the decision must have been issued either in the state where the debtor has its seat or domicile or in the state where the debtor has its centre of main interests.

Demonstrating that dissenting creditors are no worse off under a contested restructuring plan than in the relevant alternative is an essential requirement for the court to exercise its power to sanction the plan

The power of the court to sanction a restructuring plan where one or more classes of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) is referred to as the "cross-class cram down".

Demonstrating what would most likely happen if a restructuring plan were not sanctioned is an essential element for the exercise of the court's discretion to cram down the votes of dissenting creditors

Restructuring plans under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) may provide an alternative for companies in financial distress to formal insolvency (see our previous Insight).

Restructuring plans can provide companies in the early stages of financial difficulty with a flexible alternative to entering a formal insolvency procedure

Under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), companies or groups encountering financial difficulties affecting their ability to carry on business can propose a compromise or arrangement (a restructuring plan) which mitigates or eliminates the effects of those financial difficulties.

The long-awaited new Luxembourg law on business preservation and modernisation of bankruptcy law voted by the Luxembourg Parliament on 19 July 2023 (the Law) implementing EU Directive 2019/1023 of 20 June 2019 contains a range of new preventive reorganisation procedures, notably (i) conservatory measures (appointment of a conciliator), (ii) an out-of-court reorganization procedure by mutual agreement (réorganisation par accord amiable) and (iii) judicial reorganisation proceedings (JRP).

If bankruptcy proceedings are commenced against a debtor or if a debtor enters into a court-approved composition agreement with an assignment of all of its assets, transactions executed by the debtor during the last five years are subject to scrutiny.

The purpose of claw back claims is to recover assets extracted from or given away by an insolvent debtor for the benefit of its insolvency estate and ultimately its creditors. Transactions may be subject to claw back actions if:

European leveraged finance transactions (i.e., acquisition financing by fund sponsors of European targets) are often structured through Luxembourg or the Netherlands because those are creditor-friendly jurisdictions for the creation, perfection and enforcement of (certain) security interests. Structuring through Luxembourg or the Netherlands provides a high degree of transaction flexibility compared to other jurisdictions.