Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.
The decision of the High Court of Australia in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) clarified the limits of a Bankruptcy Court's discretion to "go behind" a judgment, that is, to investigate whether the underlying debt relied upon for the making of a sequestration order is, in truth and reality, owing to the petitioning creditor. Recently, the Ramsay decision was applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002 (Dunkerley).
On 22 August 2019, the Federal Court of Australia (FCA) held that it could make a request to the New Zealand High Court (NZHC) that there be a joint hearing of those courts in respect of applications relating to the pooling of various funds held by companies subject to Australian and New Zealand liquidations, respectively.
Such a ‘letter of request’ could be issued by the FCA to a foreign court in the context of an Australian insolvency process pursuant to section 581 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act).
In But Ka Chon v Interactive Brokers LLC [2019] HKCA 873, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal to set aside a statutory demand arising out of online forex futures trading debts.
On 19 June 2019, the much-anticipated High Court appeal in the matter of Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20 (also known as the "Amerind appeal") was handed down.
In Nicholas Stewart Wood and David John Standish (as the joint trustees in bankruptcy of Karl Eric Watkin) v Kate Rebecca Watkin [2019] EWHC 1311 (Ch), trustees in bankruptcy sought to establish that a bankrupt (theBankrupt) was the sole beneficial owner of three properties (theProperties), ostensibly purchased by him for his adult daughter. The High Court refused the application and held that the Bankrupt was not the sole beneficial owner of the Properties.
UK taxpayers paid over £60 million to repatriate around 110,000 passengers stranded abroad following the failure of Monarch in October 2017. The UK Government commissioned the Airline Insolvency Review to assess the existing protections available to passengers in the event of a future airline insolvency and make recommendations to ensure taxpayers no longer foot the repatriation bill. The review has now published its final report. It remains to be seen which of the recommendations (if any) will be implemented but some of them have the potential for far reaching changes in the sector.
Key takeaways
Liquidators are encouraged to seek advice or directions from the Court as to the discharge of their responsibilities. But who bears the costs of such proceedings, of the liquidator and of any contradictor involved?
In the recent case of In the matter of Gondon Five Pty Limited and Cui Family Asset Management Pty Limited [2019] NSWSC 469, the New South Wales Supreme Court (Brereton J) considered the purpose and scope of an appointment as receiver to a company, and came down particularly hard on an insolvency practitioner for performing work and incurring expenses which were determined to be outside, or not incidental to, the scope of his appointment.
Background