Even if the statutory conditions for cramming down the votes of dissenting creditors has been met, the court retains a discretion to consider other factors

Certain statutory conditions need to be met in order for the court to sanction a plan at least one class of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) – referred to as the "cross-class cram down".

Demonstrating that dissenting creditors are no worse off under a contested restructuring plan than in the relevant alternative is an essential requirement for the court to exercise its power to sanction the plan

The power of the court to sanction a restructuring plan where one or more classes of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) is referred to as the "cross-class cram down".

When a company is in the so-called “twilight zone” approaching insolvency, it is well-established that the directors’ fiduciary duties require them to take into account interest of creditors (the so-called “creditor duty”).

Demonstrating what would most likely happen if a restructuring plan were not sanctioned is an essential element for the exercise of the court's discretion to cram down the votes of dissenting creditors

Restructuring plans under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) may provide an alternative for companies in financial distress to formal insolvency (see our previous Insight).

Restructuring plans can provide companies in the early stages of financial difficulty with a flexible alternative to entering a formal insolvency procedure

Under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), companies or groups encountering financial difficulties affecting their ability to carry on business can propose a compromise or arrangement (a restructuring plan) which mitigates or eliminates the effects of those financial difficulties.

In a recent case, the High Court has had one of its first opportunities to consider BTI v Sequana [2022] UKSC 25 (see our previous update here), in which the Supreme Court gave important guidance on the existence and scope of the duty of company directors to have regard to the interests of creditors (the so-called “creditor duty”, which arises in an insolvency scenario).

The judgement raises important questions for directors faced with substantial liabilities

The Federal Court of Australia recently determined an application brought by the administrators of a company in voluntary administration seeking judicial guidance on how to deal with claims for costs and interests resulting from two prior arbitrations. The key issue was whether the costs and interests awarded in the previous arbitrations were admissible to proof in the administration of the company, having regard to the fact that the relevant arbitral awards were made after the appointment of administrators.

The Court made a distinction between the two arbitrations as follows:

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (the Committee) has delivered its report following an inquiry into the “effectiveness of Australia’s corporate insolvency laws in protecting and maximising value for the benefit of all interested parties and the economy”.

The English Court of Appeal has clarified the interpretation of two aspects of s.423 of the Insolvency Act 1986, the legislation which provides a mechanism for the avoidance of transactions which have been made for the purpose of defrauding creditors:Invest Bank PSC v Ahmad Mohammad El-Husseini [2023] EWCA Civ 555.