Hong Kong is a common law jurisdiction, and its legal system is based on English law. Following Hong Kong’s handover to China on 1 July 1997, the Basic Law of Hong Kong is the constitutional document of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Article 8 of the Basic Law provides that: “laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravene [the Basic Law], and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”

11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2) provides (emphasis added):

• “(c) . . . the condition that a plan be fair and equitable . . . includes . . . (2) . . . all of the projected disposable income of the debtor to be received in the 3-year period, or such longer period not to exceed 5 years as the court may fix, . . . will be applied to make payments under the plan.”

There is little-to-no guidance in the Bankruptcy Code on what “as the court may fix” might mean. So, that meaning is left to the courts to decide.

Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), an individual debtor may be denied a discharge, in its entirely, for making a transfer “with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” a creditor or the trustee.

On April 17, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court for Eastern Michigan ruled:

A “silent” creditor in Subchapter V is one who does not vote on the debtor’s plan and does not object to that plan. The “silent” creditor is a problem for Subchapter V cases.

The Problem

Here’s the problem:

Here are a couple discharge-related bankruptcy questions I’ve heard of late, along with an answer.

Question 1. Why are individuals, but not corporations, eligible for a Chapter 7 discharge?

• §727(a)(1) says, “the court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless—(1) the debtor is not an individual” (emphasis added).

Question 2. Why are individuals, but not corporations, subject to § 523(a) discharge exceptions in Chapter 11?

Le 27 juin 2024, la Cour suprême des États-Unis a publié une décision très attendue qu’elle a rendue dans l’affaire William K. Harrington, United States Trustee, Region 2, Petitioner v. Purdue Pharma L.P. et al. (l’« affaire Purdue »).

The Privy Council has recently delivered a landmark judgment on the interplay between arbitration agreements and winding up petitions. The Board held that the English case of Salford Estates (No 2) Ltd v Altomart Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1575; Ch 589, which had adopted a pro-arbitration approach to stay or dismiss winding up petitions based on debts covered by arbitration agreements, even if the debts were not genuinely disputed on substantial grounds was wrongly decided.

Can non-compete and confidentiality protections in a rejected franchise agreement be discharged in bankruptcy?

The answer is, “No,” according to In re Empower Central Michigan, Inc.[Fn. 1]

Facts

Debtor is an automotive repair shop.

Debtor operates under a Franchise Agreement with Autolab Franchising, LLC. The Franchise Agreement has a non-compete provision, and there is a separate-but-related confidentiality agreement.

The continuing effort in Congress to extend Subchapter V’s $7.5 million debt limit recently hit a snag. The result: the $7.5 million debt limit for Subchapter V eligibility expired on June 21, 2024, and the Subchapter V debt limit is now reduced to an inflation-adjusted $3,024,725.[i]

On June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States released its highly anticipated decision in William K. Harrington, United States Trustee, Region 2, Petitioner v. Purdue Pharma L.P. et al. (Purdue). At issue was whether the U.S. bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to confirm a plan that provided for releases in favour of non-debtor parties, including parties providing a significant monetary contribution in support of the plan itself.