Insolvency Set-Off and Construction Contract Adjudications in light of Bresco Electrical Services Ltd (in liquidation) v Michael J Lonsdale (electrical) Ltd; Cannon Corporate Ltd v Primus Build Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 27
This case concerned both the appeal in Bresco v Lonsdale and Cannon Corporate v Primus Build. The present case comment is only concerned with the former.
Background
Bresco appealed to set aside the order of an injunction from Fraser J. That injunction prevented the continuation of an adjudication in which Bresco and Lonsdale (in liquidation) sought sums from each other in claims and cross-claims.
Introduction
The recent decision of Andrew Burrows QC, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, in Palliser Limited v Fate Limited (In Liquidation) [2019] EWHC 43 (QB), is a useful reminder of the difficulties that can arise where one party (here a tenant) relies on another (its landlord) to take out insurance.
The Facts
In 2010, a fire started at the ground floor restaurant owned and operated by a company called Fate Limited (“Fate”). It was not in dispute that the fire was caused by Fate’s negligence.
A Court of Appeal decision last week has broadly upheld previous TCC guidance as to the ability of companies in liquidation or those subject to CVAs to commence and enforce adjudication proceedings against their creditors. Although theoretically possible, adjudication proceedings commenced by companies in liquidation are now liable to be restrained by a court injunction. Adjudications by companies subject to a CVA are more likely to be appropriate and, depending on the circumstances, may be enforced without a stay of execution.
Insolvency set-off: a recap
Re SHB Realisation Ltd (formerly BHS Ltd); Wright and another (as joint liquidators of SHB Realisations Ltd (formerly BHS Ltd)) v Prudential Assurance Companies Ltd [2018] EWHC 402 (Ch); [2018] All ER (D) 58 (Mar)
Synopsis
Daniel Gatty discusses the recent High Court ruling in Leon v Her Majesty’s Attorney General and others [2018] EWHC 3026 (Ch) and its impact on the grant of vesting orders following the disclaimer of a lease.
Readers of this column will be aware of the complications that can ensue when a lease is disclaimed by a tenant’s liquidator under section 178 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986), by a tenant’s trustee in bankruptcy under section 315 of the IA 1986 or by the Crown under section 1013 of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) following dissolution of a tenant company.
This is the third occasion on which I have posted on this blog on the issue of after the event insurance (ATE) policies and the impact which they have on applications for security for costs.
In the first post on 16 November 2017, I praised the judgment of Snowden J in Premier Motorauctions v Pricewaterhouse Coopers for appearing to bring clarity to an area which had for some time struggled with near irreconcilable decisions.
The Chancellor announced in his budget that the Crown is to be re-instated as a preferential creditor in insolvency, reversing the changes brought in by The Enterprise Act 2002.
In the wake of increased competition stemming from the recent liberalisation of the Bulgarian electricity market, more and more electricity players and major electricity traders such as Future Energy and Energy Financing Group are now facing serious financial difficulties.
According to reports, some are now fighting to stay afloat after the initiation of insolvency proceedings. Given this increased market pressure, analysts state it is likely these and other energy traders may declare bankruptcy and face eventual liquidation.
A draft government ordinance amending the Romanian insolvency law was published on September 12. The bill is intended to increase recoverability of state receivables from insolvent companies and to reduce the debtor’s control over the proceedings.
One of the main changes relates to denying the existing right of the insolvent debtor to nominate an insolvency practitioner to be appointed as official receiver. Under the current procedure, it was mandatory for the insolvency court to follow debtor’s proposal, if the creditors did not make a proposal of their own.