Assume that you have a company which has ceased trading and is left with a cash balance. You could extract most of the cash by paying a dividend, but that would be inefficient for tax purposes (resulting in tax rates of up to 39.35%). So, instead, you decide to wind the company up and receive the proceeds as a capital distribution, taking advantage of the lower capital gains tax rates (generally at 10% or 20% depending on the circumstances). Surely that is legitimate?
Bankruptcy Court denies a party’s request to enforce arbitration of a legal malpractice claim—and then dismisses that malpractice claim for failure to state a claim.
The opinion is Murray v. Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (In re Murray Energy Holdings Co.), Adv. Pro. No. 22-2007, Southern Ohio Bankruptcy Court (decided October 5, 2023, Doc. 89)—appeal is pending.
Context
This ideal is floating around:
- upon removal of a Subchapter V debtor from possession, for fraud or other cause,
- the Subchapter V trustee has no expanded right, power, function or duty beyond operating debtor’s business (the “Ideal”).
This Ideal is both:
- contrary to unambiguous language of the Bankruptcy Code, as a matter of law; and
- in Never-Never Land, as a matter of practice.
I’ll try to explain.
This is a truism:
As a director of a company, the regulatory landscape in England and Wales can feel like a scary place. The possible ways a director can become exposed can feel endless – especially if one asks Google.
Just ask any corporate lawyer fortunate enough to own the tome that is the Companies Act 2006. In the absence of becoming a legal expert, what can directors practically do to best protect themselves when carrying out their role?
A study on using round-number offers and precise-number offers in negotiations reaches these two conclusions:
Here’s the latest opinion on a controversial question: In re Franco’s Paving LLC, Case No. 23-20069, Southern Texas Bankruptcy Court, (decided 10/5/2023; Doc. 74).
The Question & Answer
Voter apathy is a problem in Subchapter V cases. That apathy is in the form of creditors failing or refusing to vote on a Subchapter V plan. The In re Franco’s opinion addresses this apathy problem head-on.
Recent expressions of concern about courts mandating mediation reminded me of a mandated mediation process that worked well: the City of Detroit bankruptcy.
An illustration of the success of mandated mediation in the Detroit case is this line:
The Bankruptcy Judge“put an end to the public bickering over the water deal by ordering the parties into confidential mediation.”
Following the news of Birmingham City Council’s recent ‘bankruptcy’, it began a procedure under section 114 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988 which triggers an interim spending freeze whilst a mandatory review is carried out.
Those who transact with local authorities may be unsure of what the impact of such a notice means for their ongoing deals and existing contracts. This article aims to demystify the process and explain the potential impact on property transactions, including issues to consider for existing agreements with a local authority.
In Purdue Pharma, the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari on this question:
The absolute priority rule [Fn. 1] has been a problem for businesses in bankruptcy—for a very long time! The rule dates back to at least 1899, when the U.S. Supreme Court prevents certain shareholder actions “until the interests of unsecured creditors have been preserved.” [Fn. 2]
Since then, the U.S. Supreme Court has followed a long and relatively straight road for the absolute priority rule. And the rule has shown staying power, along that road.