In Aventura2, a recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”), the Honourable Justice Penny confirmed that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the authority, pursuant to section 30(1)(k) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”), to disclaim a lease on behalf of a bankrupt landlord. Rather, a trustee’s authority to disclaim a lease is limited to situations where the bankrupt is the tenant.
Mango Boulevard Pty Ltd & Anor v Whitton & Ors [2015] FCA 1169
A bankruptcy trustee’s notice objecting to discharge on one of the special grounds specified in the Bankruptcy Act 1966 can be valid even if based on additional unstated reasons, so long as those reasons are directed to the achievement of a purpose of the law of bankruptcy.
On October 13, 2015, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “Court”) dismissed the so-called “interest stops rule” appeal in the Nortel matter,[1] thereby confirming that the rule applies in proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”). The Court’s decision also appears to eliminate any suggestion that the rule only applies to so-called “liquidating” CCAA proceedings.
BH Apartments v Sutherland Nominees [2015] VSC 381
The costs of ‘convening’. Whether the person requesting a meeting of creditors, pursuant to 5.6.15(1)(b) of the Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) be called is only liable for the costs of calling the meeting.
Sutherland Nominees Pty Ltd (Sutherland) was being administered pursuant to a deed of company arrangement under part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
On May 1, 2015, the Alberta Court of Appeal rendered its decision in 1773907 Alberta Ltd. v. Davidson, 2015 ABCA 150, and allowed an appeal permitting an action, brought in the name of an insolvent company, to proceed, notwithstanding that the company had assigned this claim to a third party. As will be discussed, the assignment of an action to a third party is often found to be caught by the doctrines of champerty and maintenance, and the decision by the Court serves to identify where such an assignment will be permitted.
Di Cioccio v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Di Cioccio) [2015] FCAFC 30
Whether inconsistency between Div 4B of Pt VI, s 58(1)(b) in Div 4 of Pt IV and s 116 of Pt VI of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
An appeal from the decision of Di Cioccio v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2014] FCA 782.
On June 6, 2014, Justice Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) released additional reasons1 to his decision in Romspen Investment Corp. v. 6711162 Canada Inc., 2014 ONSC 2781, centred on the cost submissions made by counsel to Romspen Investment Corp. (“Romspen”). Despite a contractual provision in a mortgage agreement that gave the applicant, Romspen, a right to full indemnity costs from the respondents, Justice Brown found that the legal fees incurred by counsel to Romspen were unreasonable.
Factoring is a common way for businesses to monetize current assets. Typically, in a factoring transaction, an enterprise sells its accounts receivable to a third party (commonly a bank, but not always), which, in exchange for a discount on the value of the receivables, takes on the effort and time commitment related to collecting the accounts.
The recent decision by the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “Court”) in 306440 Ontario Ltd. v. 782127 Ontario Ltd.1 serves as a cautionary reminder to secured creditors that their position may not always be at the top of the insolvency food chain, even when they have taken all the proper steps to perfect their security interests.
On December 1, 2014, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “Court of Appeal”) released its decision, written for the Court of Appeal by Madam Justice Pepall, in Bank of Nova Scotia v. Diemer, 2014 ONCA 851 (“Diemer”). The Court of Appeal dismissed the court-appointed receiver’s (the “Receiver”) appeal of the order of Justice Goodman, which, among other things, reduced the fees of counsel (“Counsel”) to the Receiver.