In the recent case of Peterborough (City) v. Kawartha Native Housing Society, the Ontario Court of Appeal was asked to determine:

Unremitted source deductions are subject to a deemed trust in favour of the Crown under Section 227 of the Income Tax Act (the “ITA”), Section 86 of theEmployment Insurance Act (the “EIA”) and Section 23 of the Canada Pension Plan (the “CPP”). Subsection 227(4) of the ITA creates the trust for income tax deductions and Subsection 227(4.1) creates a super-priority lien in favour of the Crown, in the amount of the trust, over all the debtor’s assets.

In its recent decision in Century Services Inc v Canada,1 the Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”) held that, in the context of a Companies’Creditors Arrangement Act2 (the “CCAA”) proceeding, the Crown does not have a superpriority claim over the property of a debtor for unremitted goods and services tax (“GST”) amounts. The decision of the SCC majority rejected existing appellate-level case law, and brought the priority of Crown claims in-line with what they are in bankruptcy proceedings.

The case of Canrock Ventures LLC v. Ambercore Software Inc. et al is a cautionary tale for a Receiver and its counsel alike. In this case, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice rejected a Receiver’s application for the approval of an asset purchase agreement because of a failure to take the requisite steps when conducting a sale process and, in the Court’s view, failing to remain a neutral officer of the Court.

In a previous Financial Services Flash, we brought to your attention the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Bankruptcy Court”) in the case ofIn re Tousa. In a decision that raised serious concerns for lenders in the United States, Justice Olson held that the first and second ranking secured lenders of Tousa Inc. (“Tousa”) did not act in good faith and were grossly negligent in providing Tousa with a secured loan less than six months before Tousa filed for bankruptcy.

A recent Supreme Court judgement has confirmed that where an individual, Mr X, acts as director of company A, and company A is the sole director of company B, that will not necessarily make Mr X a “de facto” director of company B.

The Court decided that the mere fact of acting as a director of a corporate director was not enough to render the individual a de-facto director, “something more” would be required, such as the director holding himself out in correspondence as a director of company B.

The 2010 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Murphy v. Sally Creek Environs Corp. (Trustee of) considered the role of a trustee in bankruptcy as an officer of the court and its obligation to act fairly and with integrity throughout bankruptcy proceedings.

In April 2010, we reported on the decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (the “Superior Court”) in In the Matter of the Proposal of C.I.F. Furniture Limited (“CIF”) which dealt with the question of circular priorities. This decision was recently upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal (“Court of Appeal”). The Court of Appeal’s decision will offer some comfort to lenders where intercreditor agreements exist between some but not all of the secured lenders of a borrower.

Rainy Sky SA et al v Kookmin Bank [2010] All ER (D) 255 (May) In our Spring 2010 e-news we reported on the case of Kookmin Bank which dealt with the interpretation of a refund guarantee between Kookmin Bank (the “Bank”) and the customer of an insolvent shipyard. The Bank issued a refund guarantee to secure obligations assumed by its customer Jinse Shipbuilding (the “Builder”). The agreement required the Bank to repay on demand all of the instalments paid by the buyer, Rainy Sky, on the occurrence of a default event under the refund guarantee.

Section 113 of the Housing Grants, Construction & Regeneration Act 1996 (the 1996 Act) outlaws pay when paid provisions, with one exception. It is permissible for a Contractor to use a pay when paid provision to deny payment of outstanding amounts due to its Sub-contractor where the Client at the top of the supply chain has gone bust. The general consensus is of course that this exception is unfair. It is essentially asking the Sub-contractors to act as insurers of both the main Contractor and Client insolvency.