The common law has long recognized a secured creditor’s duty to provide reasonable notice to borrowers before enforcing its security and appointing a receiver. The practical importance of this has become less significant since the codification of the principle of reasonable notice in section 244 of theBankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”). However, in the recent case of Bank of Montreal v.

In an earlier blog I touched upon the belief which exists within certain parts of the market that there is still a way to go in the re-pricing of non-prime assets. Some commentators are predicting that this re-pricing will take place through 2012 and into 2013, the hope being that we will start to see greater activity in the secondary market in the second half of next year.

The Court of Appeal has clarified in the case of Key2law (Surrey) LLP v Gaynor De’Antiquis [2011] EWCA Civ 1567 that administration proceedings do not constitute “insolvency proceedings which have been instituted with a view to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor” in terms of regulation 8(7) of the TUPE Regulations 2006 and therefore fall outside the scope of regulation 8(7).

In the midst of the ongoing restructurings of Nortel and AbitibiBowater, the New Democrats introduced Bill C-501 in the spring of 2010 to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”) and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) with the goal of better protecting employees’ interests in the context of formal insolvency proceedings, including pension interests. However, Bill C-501 did not become law.

Introduction

In “True Lease v. Security Lease – Is the Distinction Still Relevant?” which appeared in the June 2008 issue of Collateral Matters, Jill Fraser discussed a 2007 amendment to the Personal Property Security Act (Ontario) (the “PPSA”) and whether or not the distinction between a true lease and a security lease was still relevant in light of that amendment.

In its judgment of 11 October 2011, the English Court of Appeal analysed the terms of an aircraft purchase agreement (the “Agreement”) entered into by Gesner and the aircraft manufacturer Bombardier.  The Agreement was in Bombardier’s standard terms.  Gesner, the purchaser, sought to terminate the agreement on the grounds that Bombardier had delayed in fulfilling its contractual obligations.  Thereafter, Bombardier sought to retain certain monies as liquidated damages upon termination of the Agreement.  Gesner challenged this retention.

Application for an administration order in respect of FM Front Door Ltd. The application followed FM’s failure to make payments under a loan from the Dunfermline Building Society obtained to assist with the purchase of flats at the Skyline development on Finniestoun Street in Glasgow.  The loan was secured by a floating charge and standard securities over each of the flats. FM’s parent company FM Developments also granted a guarantee for the loan.

Clause 13 of the loan agreement provided that the grounds for default included:

Section 11.01 of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) states that no order under Section 11 or 11.02 of the CCAA has the effect of: (a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, the use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided after the order is made; or (b) requiring the further advance of money or credit.

As most are aware by now, the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “OCA”) recently caused alarm by finding that claims of pension plan beneficiaries ranked higher than the super-priority debtor-in-possession financing charge (the “DIP Charge”) created by the amended initial order (the “CCAA Order”) in the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) proceedings of the Indalex group of Canadian companies (collectively, “Indalex”).

During the past 14 months, courts in Ontario have rendered three decisions dealing with the application of limitation periods to claims for fraudulent conveyances or preferences. A “limitation period” is a period of time, specified in a statute, within which a plaintiff must commence a court proceeding to seek a remedy. Otherwise, the claim is said to be “statute-barred” and an action to enforce the claim will be dismissed.

The recent decisions have brought some clarity to the law in this area, but have left other questions unanswered.

Background