This is the second in a series of articles highlighting the changes to be brought in by the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Amendment) Ordinance 2016 (Amendment Ordinance), which was gazetted on 3 June 2016 and will come into effect on a date to be appointed by the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury.

The Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Amendment) Ordinance 2016 (Amendment Ordinance), gazetted on 3 June 2016, will come into effect on a date to be appointed by the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury. It amends the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, Cap 32. This article is the first in a series, highlighting the major changes to be introduced.

Aims of Amendment Ordinance

The Amendment Ordinance aims to:

When Cayman Islands funds undergo liquidity stress on their balance sheet due to holding illiquid assets or irregular large redemption requests, directors of Cayman Islands funds generally consider mechanics to provide for an orderly restructure to meet redemption requests which arise. Common arrangements are to implement a “redemption gate” which limits redemptions to a certain percentage of shares in the fund or a stronger response such as a suspension of all redemptions.

Under the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6) (“BO”), a person who has been adjudged bankrupt will be entitled to be discharged from bankruptcy four years after the making of the bankruptcy order, unless it is a second bankruptcy or the period is extended by the Court. The maximum extension is an additional four year period.

Secured creditors should take note of Callidus,¹ wherein the Federal Court (the “Court”) held that the bankruptcy of a tax debtor rendered a statutory deemed trust under section 222 of the Excise Tax Act (the “ETA”) ineffective as against a secured creditor who, prior to the bankruptcy, received proceeds from the tax debtor’s assets.

Background

In Aventura², a recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”), the Honourable Justice Penny confirmed that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the authority, pursuant to section 30(1)(k) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”), to disclaim a lease on behalf of a bankrupt landlord. Rather, a trustee’s authority to disclaim a lease is limited to situations where the bankrupt is the tenant.

On October 13, 2015, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “Court”) dismissed the so-called “interest stops rule” appeal in the Nortel matter,^[1] thereby confirming that the rule applies in proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”). The Court’s decision also appears to eliminate any suggestion that the rule only applies to so-called “liquidating” CCAA proceedings.

On May 1, 2015, the Alberta Court of Appeal rendered its decision in 1773907 Alberta Ltd. v. Davidson, 2015 ABCA 150, and allowed an appeal permitting an action, brought in the name of an insolvent company, to proceed, notwithstanding that the company had assigned this claim to a third party. As will be discussed, the assignment of an action to a third party is often found to be caught by the doctrines of champerty and maintenance, and the decision by the Court serves to identify where such an assignment will be permitted.

Section 42 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6) (“BO”) provides that where a person is adjudged bankrupt, any disposition of property made by that person from the date of presentation of the bankruptcy petition is void unless made with the consent of the Court or unless subsequently ratified by the Court. The purpose of this section is to prevent the improper dissipation of the bankrupt’s assets once a bankruptcy petition is filed and to protect the principle of pari passu distribution.

On June 6, 2014, Justice Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) released additional reasons¹ to his decision in Romspen Investment Corp. v. 6711162 Canada Inc., 2014 ONSC 2781, centred on the cost submissions made by counsel to Romspen Investment Corp. (“Romspen”). Despite a contractual provision in a mortgage agreement that gave the applicant, Romspen, a right to full indemnity costs from the respondents, Justice Brown found that the legal fees incurred by counsel to Romspen were unreasonable.