OTL was placed into compulsory liquidation. Prior to this it transferred monies to a trust located in HK of which N was perceived to be the principal trustee. The OR as liquidator applied for an order under s 236(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) that N produce a witness statement with supporting documents in relation to the company’s affairs. The primary question for HHJ Hodge QC was whether s 236(3) of the IA 1986 could have extra-territorial effect as N was resident in HK.

Held

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding at trial of HHJ Bird (sitting in the High Court) that save where there is fraud, a debtor is not legally obliged to volunteer information to an assignee regarding his arrangement with the assignor. The dispute arose because Bibby, a factor (and ‘Assignee’), purchased debts from Morleys Ltd (‘the Assignor’), owed to it by HFD Ltd and MCD Ltd (the ‘Customers’/‘Debtors’). The contract between the Assignor and Customers was such that the latter were entitled to a rebate, at the beginning of each calendar year, on purchases made.

Summary

Having successfully obtained judgment for your client in a case where your firm of solicitors is acting under a conditional fee agreement (CFA), it is only natural that thoughts will turn to the firm’s own impending financial reward. But the terms of a CFA, negotiated at the outset of the case, can prove to be a barrier to their underlying commercial purpose: payment by result.

Section 262(1) of the IA 1986 provides that a debtor, creditor or nominee may apply to the court where: (a) a voluntary arrangement approved by a creditors’ meeting summoned under section 257 unfairly prejudices the interests of a creditor of the debtor, or (b) there has been some material irregularity at or in relation to such a meeting. 

In 2011, the Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), which gave voice to the Court’s grave concerns about the constitutional limits of bankruptcy court jurisdiction and raised several questions that have confounded courts and lawyers for three years. Last week, the Supreme Court issued its first follow-up ruling, answering some of those questions and clarifying how bankruptcy courts are to handle so-called Stern claims. Despite that guidance, the opinion leaves several important questions unanswered.

As expected (and predicted), the bankruptcy judge in Dallas, Texas granted Mt. Gox’s request for an order of “recognition” that the debtor’s Tokyo insolvency action was a “foreign main proceeding.” She will also allow Mt. Gox’s bankruptcy trustee, Nobuaki Kobayahsi, to act as the “foreign representative” of the debtor in connection with whatever relief it might seek in the Chapter 15 case.

On June 18, 2014, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Dallas will consider whether to grant recognition to the insolvency case pending in Tokyo. Based on the pleadings filed last week, it is a virtual certainty that the court will enter an order granting recognition.

On May 21, the bankruptcy trustee for Mt. Gox advised depositors that the bankruptcy case in Tokyo was proceeding.  The information contained in the email was limited in scope, guarded and of little use in understanding the trustee’s view of how the bankruptcy ultimately may resolve. 

On April 28, in the wake of Mt. Gox’s Japanese rehabilitation proceeding having been converted to a liquidation proceeding, a proposal for selling and restarting the Mt. Gox exchange was submitted in the pending class action litigation in Illinois. The proposal was accepted by plaintiffs in the class action litigation before a class had even been certified.