This briefing note provides an outline of the different processes of voluntary and compulsory winding up under the Companies (Guernsey) Law, 2008 (as amended) (the “Law”). It does not cover striking off companies or the specific provisions on winding up of protected cell companies and incorporated cell companies. Further information on the effect of the Law on the winding up of these company structures can be found in our separate briefing notes on those subjects.

The mechanics of a voluntary winding up

1 / FEBRUARY 2017 | Cell Companies in Guernsey BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS CAYMAN ISLANDS GUERNSEY JERSEY CAPE TOWN HONG KONG LONDON SINGAPORE WWW.CAREYOLSEN.COM FEBRUARY 2017 INVESTMENT FUNDS & INSURANCE CELL COMPANIES IN GUERNSEY 2 / FEBRUARY 2017 | Cell Companies in Guernsey INTRODUCTION This note summarises Guernsey law relating to protected and incorporated cell companies. For more detailed information on protected cell companies and incorporated cell companies please see the separate briefing notes on each.

This briefing note describes the key features of the incorporated cell company (“ICC”) and summarises the formation, structure and liquidation procedures particular to this type of company.

Key features

The BVI Commercial Court (the Honourable Justice Davis-White QC [Ag]) has recently ordered the appointment of liquidators over Pacific Andes Enterprises (BVI) Limited, Parkmond Group Limited, and PARD Trade Limited (the “Companies”), three BVI incorporated companies forming a key part of the China Fishery Group.

The applications were unsuccessfully contested on the principal ground that the appointment of liquidators would irretrievably damage the prospects of a wider, global restructuring of the Pacific Andes Group.

A federal district court recently rejected the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s attempt to hold a buyer of assets liable for the seller’s unfunded defined benefit plan liabilities under a successor liability theory.[1] While the court decided the issue in favor of the buyer, it is a cautionary tale for buyers as it appears to be the first time the PBGC has argued for the application of successor liability in this context and is a depar

This briefing note provides an outline of the different processes of voluntary winding up and striking off under the Companies (Guernsey) Law, 2008 (as amended) (the “Law”). It does not cover compulsory winding up or the specific provisions on winding up of protected cell companies and incorporated cell companies. Further information on the effect of the Law on the winding up of these company structures can be found in our separate briefing notes on those subjects.

Voluntary Winding Up

Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (“TIA”) provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the right of a holder of an indenture security to receive principal and interest payments, or to institute suit to enforce such payments after they become due, shall not be impaired or affected without such holder’s consent. Market participants had long viewed Section 316(b) of the TIA as a “boilerplate” provision, contained or incorporated by reference in most high yield indentures, that protected only a bondholder’s right to bring suit to enforce payment obligations.

Introduction

After months of drama prompted by the intertwined destinies of a constitutional referendum and the recapitalization of Monte dei Paschi di Siena (“MPS”), Italy’s third largest bank, and following the resignation of the Renzi government, the first important measure approved by the new Italian cabinet was an emergency decree aimed at safeguarding the Italian banking sector.

In three recent decisions the courts have examined the limits on a liquidator’s ability to obtain court orders compelling third parties to provide documents held by them, as well as deciding on the recoverability of costs incurred by third parties complying with production orders that are made against them.

When a fund fails, the disappointed investors’ sole hope of recompense often rests on the fund’s liquidators gathering in and distributing pari passu as many of the fund’s assets as possible. On the other hand, those investors who successfully redeemed shortly before the fund’s collapse might regard the liquidators’ efforts with a degree of concern.