引言
在当今国际国内供应链债务违约增多的背景下，作为供应链体系中重要支付手段的票据违约也不断集中爆发。当票据违约遭遇票据当事人破产，持票人追偿票据债权将更为困难和复杂。本文主要探讨不同破产情形下持票人行权的策略，以及破产重整计划对持票人行使追索权的可能影响，望对供应链行业交易合规和纠纷解决有所启发。
一、承兑人或出票人破产情形下，持票人追偿票据债权的策略选择
以往银行汇票较少出现承兑人（或付款人）破产的情形，多为出票人破产，但近些年如包商银行破产、以及大型企业集团破产带来的其集团财务公司破产，使得银行汇票中承兑人破产也成为了现实问题。就商业汇票而言，出票人与付款人/承兑人可能为同一主体，也可能为不同主体，均有可能陷入破产困境。在不同情形下持票人追偿债权的可能策略，值得探讨。
根据测算，截止2022年年初，国内烂尾项目规模已经超过2万亿，随着2021年大型房地产公司接连“暴雷”，势必会产生更多的烂尾或接近烂尾的项目。对于商业逻辑自洽的单体项目破产重组，借助破产清算或重整程序分兵突围势必成为地方政府主导重整的最优路径。但是鉴于目前的房地产市场行情以及烂尾项目续建的特点，大部分重整投资人，尤其是财务投资类型的重整投资人更倾向于采用固定收益的方式进行项目重整，既能实现维护稳定的社会效果，又能最大限度地保证投资安全。因此，如何在当前法律架构下保障固定收益重整投资人的利益是本文中讨论的主要问题。
一 重整投资人的收益模式对比
重整投资人参与烂尾项目的收益模式大致可以分为固定收益模式、风险收益模式和固定加风险收益模式。不同的收益模式下重整投资人有不同的投资逻辑，也有不同的退出模式。我们从投入、收益、风险以及安全性角度对固定收益模式与风险收益模式进行了比较。
（一）固定收益模式
固定收益模式的特点是重整投资人投入重整资金，约定固定收益率，在最终财产变现所得中优先收回投资本金及收益，项目剩余资产全部用于债权清偿。
根据全国人大常委会执法检查组关于检查企业破产法实施情况的报告，党的十八大以来，随着供给侧结构性改革持续深化，加快建立和完善市场主体挽救和退出机制，加之新冠肺炎疫情对于宏观经济运行的深刻影响，我国企业破产案件数量快速上升，2017年至2020年受理和审结的破产案件分别占到《企业破产法》实施以来案件总量的54%和41%。[1]区别于传统的中小企业破产重整，大型或超大型企业集团的资产结构复杂、债务规模巨大、历史遗留问题众多，进入破产重整程序之后，如何在《企业破产法》的框架下实现资产重组与债务清偿、持续运营与杠杆处置、重整效率与债权人保护等多重利益关系的合理平衡，成为破产实务中的难点与痛点。随着2021年B集团实质合并重整案（以下简称“B集团重整案”）和海航集团等三百二十一家公司实质合并重整案（以下简称“海航集团重整案”）中信托计划的引入，破产重整程序中引入信托计划作为新型破产重整模式引起业界关注。本文将结合笔者在破产重整程序中设立信托计划的服务经验，简要介绍破产重整程序中信托计划定位与架构、信托机制与破产重整程序的衔接等相关实务难点问题，以供参考。
一. 破产重整程序中信托计划的概念和优势
Government support during the pandemic and extremely strong credit markets saw exceptional fund raising levels in 2021, in spite of a slower Q4. Borrowers secured increasingly favourable terms from their lenders, with only a little pushback as the year progressed. Private credit continued to compete for greater market share and found interesting opportunities in smaller and more complex names. 2021 has proved to be a record year for financings and the continued availability of cheap capital, with reasonable stability and outperformance from riskier credits.
The restructuring plan has so far proven to be a powerful tool to facilitate restructurings of complex capital structures. Two recent cases provide further helpful guidance for advisers when formulating a restructuring plan and for investors who may be affected by its terms.
Amicus Finance plc (in administration) ("Amicus")
On 29 September 2021 the High Court dismissed a challenge to Caffè Nero’s 2020 CVA brought by one of its landlords, Ronald Young. Young asserted that the CVA was unfairly prejudicial and subject to material irregularities (thereby engaging both grounds of challenge under s.6 of the Insolvency Act 1986), and that the CVA nominees and company directors had breached their duties by failing to adjourn or postpone voting on the CVA upon receipt of a late-in-the-day offer for the Caffè Nero group.
The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (Coronavirus) (Amendment of Schedule 10 Regulations 2021) (the “Regulations”) will modify CIGA by extending certain restrictions on the use of winding up petitions, albeit on a more limited basis, in line with the tapering of government support measures introduced to combat the economic impact of COVID-19.
The English High Court has sanctioned the scheme of arrangement proposed by Provident Financial, by which the net liabilities of two Provident group companies to their redress creditors will be subject to a 90-95% haircut. This case raises two interesting questions.
Why was the scheme sanctioned when the recent Amigo Loans scheme was not?
Some further important guidance by Zacaroli J in the recent judgment on Hurricane Energy. In that case, the company (with the support of the company's ad hoc committee of bond holders who were going to take 95% of the equity under the plan in return for certain adjustments to the bonds) sought to cram down the class of dissenting shareholders through a restructuring plan ("plan").
The court found that it could not sanction the scheme, despite the requisite majority of creditors having voted in favour of it. The intervention by the FCA at the sanction hearing marks an interesting development in assessing the extent to which the regulator's views will be aired and considered.