The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial, and Antitrust Law recently held hearings regarding certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, including the safe harbor from preference and fraudulent conveyance claims for “settlement payments.”
The recent case of APCOA Parking1 has set a precedent by allowing yet more non-English incorporated debtors to implement financial and corporate restructurings using English schemes of arrangement.
On March 20, 2014, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued an important decision in Stoebner v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (In re LGI Energy Solutions Inc.), No. 12-3899, Slip Op. (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 2014) that expands the scope of the “subsequent new value” defense in lawsuits seeking to clawback alleged preference payments.
On March 7, the Spanish government reformed its bankruptcy law to encourage companies to restructure their debt and avoid liquidation. The decree is one part of an ongoing reform program intended to strengthen and stabilize the Spanish financial sector. The reforms provide stronger incentives for lenders to accept write-offs, maturity extensions, and debt forgiveness for struggling companies. The new rules also reduce the majority of creditors needed to vote for a restructuring.
It seems that most bankruptcy decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court involve individual debtors, and the Supreme Court’s latest opinion is no exception. Even though the decision is not in a business bankruptcy case, it examines the bankruptcy court’s powers under Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Last Friday, Judge Sleet of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware denied Hybrid Tech Holdings LLC’s appeal of the Delaware bankruptcy court’s decision in In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc. et al, to (i) cap Hybrid Tech’s credit bid for Fisker Automotive’s assets, and (ii) require that the assets be sold via a public auction rather than directly to Hybrid Tech in a private sale.
On January 14, 2014, Judge Robert E.
Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code limits the ability of a trustee or debtor-in-possession to avoid as a constructive fraudulent transfer or preferential transfer a transaction in which the challenged settlement payment was made through a stockbroker or a financial institution.1 Because of the broad protection granted by section 546(e) – the so-called “safe harbor” provision – parties structuring a leveraged buyout (“LBO”) or similar transaction often ensure that settlement funds flow through one of the listed institutions to inoculate the beneficiaries from a later challenge as a constr
In a departure from other bankruptcy courts in the Third Circuit and her own recent prior opinion, U.S. Bankruptcy Chief Judge Mary France of the Middle District of Pennsylvania broadly interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 2 (2011), and held that a bankruptcy court lacks the constitutional authority to issue a final judgment in any fraudulent transfer action where the defendant (i) has not filed a proof of claim and (ii) has not consented to the bankruptcy judge entering a final judgment on the matter.
The Bankruptcy Code provides debtors in possession and other potential plan proponents with considerable flexibility to implement a plan under chapter 11. An important consideration is the preservation of potentially valuable causes of action held by the estate and the provision of a vehicle for post-confirmation prosecution of such claims.