Following up on our coverage in the recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling that a debtor in a Chapter 7 case cannot ‘strip off’ or void a wholly unsecured junior mortgage under section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, I had the opportunity to discuss the ruling with Colin O’Keefe of LXBN TV.
This morning, the United States Supreme Court ruled that debtors in Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases cannot “strip off,” or completely void, junior mortgages that—based on the value of the property and the amount of claims secured by senior mortgages—are completely underwater.
Timely proof of claim filings by secured creditors have “been a thorn in the side of many Chapter 13 cases involving secured creditors,” according to Judge Wood in In re Pajian. However, a recent Seventh Circuit decision may cause the industry to revise their current process for proof of claim filings. Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c) requires creditors to file proofs of claim within 90 days of the date set for the meeting of creditors. Bankruptcy courts have come to conflicting conclusions on whether Rule 3002(c)’s deadline applies to all creditors or merely unsecured ones.
A confluence of factors, including high debt, spiraling pension obligations, and lower sales and property tax revenues, has forced more municipalities to face insolvency than any time since the 1930s. The two largest municipal bankruptcies in history — Jefferson County, Ala., and Detroit, Mich. — recently ended. With the economy improving, we may never see the wave of municipal bankruptcies some commentators predicted.
On June 9, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the latest installmentin the jurisdictional saga of bankruptcy courts. As the highly anticipatedsequel to Stern v.
Effective March 23, 2015, the Ohio Revised Code will contain robust provisions for the court appointment of a receiver, which will expand the statutory grounds for such appointments and expressly authorize enumerated powers for receivers designed to facilitate the receiver’s ability to liquidate assets. In many respects the revised statute codifies a number of existing practices.
It long has been the law that unpaid creditors of an insolvent debtor can complain if the debtor sells or otherwise transfers any of its assets for less than their fair value. Assume, for example, a company in financial distress sells one of its manufacturing plants to an unrelated purchaser for $15 million. If an unpaid creditor of the seller can demonstrate the fair value of the facility at the time of the sale was $20 million, the purchaser may be required to account to the seller, or its creditors, for the $5 million difference.
In a major victory for secured creditors, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Tennessee has held that a sale of secured property must afford a secured creditor the right to credit bid for its collateral under section 363(k) of title 11 of the United States Code (Bankruptcy Code), except in extraordinary circumstances upon a showing of “cause.” The court held that even where secured party credit bidding might impact the competitive bidding process – including potentially “chilling” third party bids – this alone does not constitute sufficient cause to deny a credito
On Wednesday, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals put a nail in the coffin of the attempt by Thelen LLP’s bankruptcy trustee to claw back fees on work that the firm’s former partners took with them to their new firm, Seyfarth Shaw LLP. Here’s the opinion.
On June 9, 2014, a unanimous Supreme Court issued the latest in a series of key rulings regarding the extent of a bankruptcy court’s constitutional authority.1 Notably, while Monday’s Executive Benefitsdecision answered one important question arising out of the Court’s 2011 decision in Stern v. Marshall,2 it also left the primary question that resulted in a split in the Circuit Courts of Appeals to be decided another day.
The Aftermath of Stern v. Marshall