Currently before the Supreme Court is Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO, L.L.C.,2 in which the Court will determine whether bankruptcy judges have discretion to award compensation for the defense of a fee application under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a). The decision in Baker Botts will likely resolve a circuit split and make clear whether a defense of a fee application is necessary to the administration of the case and, therefore, compensable.
On 31 March, 2015, the Supreme People’s Court issued four model cases, including Shagang LLC. (Shagang) v. Kaitian LLC.(Kaitian), a case in relation to an objection to enforcement of a distribution plan. In the case, the Court has referred to the Deep Rock Doctrine originated from the United States, states for the first time that shareholders whose capital contribution is insufficient shall be subordinated to external creditors of the company with respect to their payable debts.
The High Court today granted special leave to the Commissioner of Taxation (Commissioner) to appeal against the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Commissioner of Taxation v Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd (in liq) [2014] FCAFC 133. The appeal is likely to be heard later this year.
Significance
On 16 January 2015, Justice Beech, of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, handed down his decision in the matters of Hamersley HMS Pty Ltd v Davis [2015] WASC 14 and Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v James [2015] WASC 10 (the Hamersley Decisions). In both matters, Hamersley sought to set aside determinations made by an adjudicator pursuant to the Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) (CCA) and Forge Group Construction Pty Ltd (In Liq) (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (Forge) sought leave to enforce the determinations.
Following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision last year in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the filing of a proof of claim on a time-barred debt in a bankruptcy case pending in the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (“FDCPA”). But as the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama recently made clear in Gurganus v. Recovery Management Systems Corp. (In re Gurganus), No. 7:14-ap-70054-BGC, 2015 WL 65089 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Jan.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has agreed to hear Bullard v. Hyde Park Savings Bank (In re Bullard), U.S., No. 14-116 (cert. granted 12/12/14). The Court's decision in this case will resolve a circuit split with regard to whether an order denying confirmation of a bankruptcy plan is a final order appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). The decision has the potential to impact Chapter 13 and Chapter 11 cases.
On 11 December 2014, Justice Croft of the Victorian Supreme Court delivered judgment approving the settlement of multiple class actions brought by investors in managed investment schemes operated by an entity of the agribusiness Great Southern Group in 2005 and 2006.
Section 1322(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code1 allows debtors to cure defaults and reinstate a
mortgage on their principal residence "until such residence is sold at a foreclosure sale that is
conducted in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law."2
Like many provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, this one appears fairly straightforward at first glance; a debtor has the right to
cure and reinstate a home mortgage until the property is sold at a foreclosure sale.
The decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court handed down this week in Commissioner of Taxation v Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd (in liq) [2014] FCAFC 133 offers welcome certainty to administrators, receivers and liquidators in relation to their obligations with respect to post-appointment tax liabilities.
Significance
In the decision of Re Arcabi Pty Ltd (Receivers & Managers Appointed) (in liq) [2014] WASC 310 the court considered:
- the application of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) (PPSA) to goods being held on a bailment or consignment basis by a company in receivership and liquidation; and
- the receivers’ rights to be indemnified for costs and expenses related to investigating and protecting the property of third parties.
What is the significance?