November 2017 saw the first successful pre-packaged bankruptcy of a wind farm operator following the introduction of this procedure to Polish bankruptcy law in January 2016. Thanks to a decision made by the bankruptcy court in Warsaw, the assets of the 6 MW wind farm in Korzęcin can now be taken over by a publicly listed company operating in the renewable energy sector.

On 12 December 2017, creditors in the long running special administration of failed stockbroking firm, MF Global UK Limited (“MF Global”), approved a company voluntary arrangement (“CVA”). This case demonstrates the flexibility of the CVA procedure and the role it can play in complex financial services cases.

What is a CVA?

According to S&P Global fixed income research, EUR 3.7 trillion of rated European company debt is due to mature between mid-2017 and the end of 2022.This gives rise to anticipation that, in the coming years, the European financial markets will be increasingly driven by refinancing, restructuring and investment in distressed assets. Respondents to the survey “Changing tides: European M&A Outlook 2017” prepared by CMS in cooperation with Mergermarket in September 2017 have also remarked on this trend.

Overview

The High Court has held that insurers who had facilitated litigation proceedings by an insolvent company were not entitled to a lien akin to a solicitor’s common law or equitable lien over the proceeds of the litigation to recover the deferred premium.

To a layperson this may came as a surprise. But, to those familiar with the secondary loan market, it is confirmation of existing law.

A “vulture fund”– including a newly incorporated company with a share capital of only £1 that has not traded and has been established for the purpose of acquiring a defaulted loan with a view to realising more by enforcing than had been expended on acquiring the debt can be a “financial institution” for the purposes of the transfer provisions of a loan agreement.

Earlier today, the Court of Appeal handed down a significant judgment dealing with the adequacy of standard form after-the-event (“ATE”) insurance to defeat an application for security for costs.

In an unanimous ruling, the Court of Appeal overturned the High Court’s judgment on the defendants’ security for costs applications in Premier Motorauctions Limited (in liquidation), Premier Motorauctions Leeds Limited (in liquidation) v PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and Lloyds Bank plc [2016] EWHC 2610 (Ch).

Under § 727(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, a court shall not grant a debtor’s discharge if “the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, from which the debtor’s financial condition or business transactions might be ascertained, unless such act or failure to act was justified under all of the circumstances of the case.” To prevail under § 727(a)(3) an objecting party must establish that the debtor has failed to maintain or preserve records.

The Eleventh Circuit has revisited the question of when a debtor may be judicially estopped from pursuing a civil lawsuit due to his or her failure to disclose the claims forming the basis of the lawsuit in their bankruptcy. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine intended to protect courts against parties who seek to manipulate the judicial process by changing their legal positions to suit the exigencies of the moment.

Last year, Burr & Forman lawyers won a decisive victory in the Eleventh Circuit, in the case of In re Failla, 838 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2016). In Failla, the Eleventh Circuit held that a debtor who files a statement of intention to “surrender” his or her house in bankruptcy may not oppose the secured creditor’s foreclosure proceeding in state court. Failla is a significant victory for secured creditors for two primary reasons. First, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the meaning of “surrender,” as used in 11 U.S.C.

Signed, sealed, delivered, but am I yours? Apparently not, according to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, at least in the context of allowed administrative expense claims under Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code.1 The Third Circuit recently considered and ruled in a case as to when goods are deemed “received” for the purposes of determining whether a creditor may recover the value of the goods as an allowed administrative expense claim under the Bankruptcy Code.