In Dubois v. Atlas Acquisitions LLC, Case No. 15-1945 (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 2016), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held in a 2-1 decision that filing proofs of claim on time-barred debts does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), at least where state law preserves the right to collect on the payment. In so holding, the court sided with the Second and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals in a circuit split regarding the viability of FDCPA claims premised on proofs of claim filed in a debtor’s bankruptcy case.

CLIENT PUBLICATION FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING & INSOLVENCY | August 9, 2016 Not So Safe After All?

CLIENT PUBLICATION Financial Restructuring & Insolvency | August 9, 2016 Judge Chapman Flips the Script US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of NY Grants Noteholders’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Lehman’s Failure to State Claim With Respect to Flip-Clause Litigation On June 28, 2016, in what essentially was a clean sweep for the noteholder and trust certificate holder defendants (the “Noteholders”), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) granted an omnibus motion to dismiss Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc.’s (“LBSF

Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit entered a decision in the General Motors bankruptcy case that found an exception to the “free and clear” language of Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code2 where adequate notice of the sale order is not provided.3 However, the exception may not be far reaching due to the “peculiar” facts of the case.

Factual Background and Lower Court Decision

In a June 3, 2016 decision¹ , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.

Learning the interplay between state rules of judicial procedure and federal bankruptcy law can be a daunting undertaking, but the pitfalls of failing to do so can be severe. A recent example of the importance of being mindful of these issues is Hewett v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee, No. 2D15–1074, 2016 WL 3065014 (Fla. 2d DCA June 1, 2016) where the filing of a bankruptcy petition ultimately cost a foreclosure defendant his right to appeal a final judgment of foreclosure.

The Second DCA summarized the procedural posture of the case as follows:

Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion in In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp.¹ that permitted the debtor, Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation (“Sabine”) to reject certain gathering and condensation agreements as executory contracts under 11 U.S.C. § 365. Because the midstream service sector finances the construction of pipelines, the costs of which are recovered over the life of gathering agreements, the Court’s decision has the potential to lead to considerable upheaval in the energy sector.

In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.¹

In a March 29, 2016 decision,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Court of Appeals") held that creditors are preempted from asserting state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbors" that, among other things, exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security (here, in the context of a leveraged buyout ("LBO")), from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.

In March 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that a landlord may be liable to a debtor’s bankruptcy estate for the value of a lease the debtor terminated early, holding the termination may be an “avoidable transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code.¹ The opinion in Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. T.D. Invs. I, LLP (In re Great Lakes Quick Lube LP)² reversed the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling, and in doing so perhaps expanded the definition of a “transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code.

Background