The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that a mortgagee’s foreclosure action did not violate an automatic stay imposed during one of the plaintiff’s chapter 13 bankruptcy schedules, where the debtor failed to amend his bankruptcy schedules to disclose his recent acquisition of the subject property from his son.

In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the mortgagee because father and son plaintiffs were judicially estopped from claiming a stay violation.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that a debtor’s claim seeking to use a bankruptcy trustee’s § 544(a) strong-arm power to avoid a mortgage on the ground that it was never perfected did not require appellate review of the state court foreclosure judgment, and therefore was not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The Court of Appeal of Jersey has now considered in an appeal against the Royal Court’s decision of 10 January 2018 the case of a UK trustee in bankruptcy (the “Trustee”), whose appointment had been recognised in Jersey by order of the Court and who had been authorised to obtain documents and/or information for particular purposes, who was later subject to coercive measures in his home jurisdiction requiring the disclosure of such material for different, unauthorised purposes (in this case an Information Notice issued by HMRC pursuant to Schedule 36 of the UK Finance Act 2008 (the “

The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit recently applied the “conceivable effect” test in holding that a bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over a state law fraud claim raised by a third party regarding the validity of a lender’s lien, and therefore, declined to consider the issue on appeal.

In so ruling, the Panel ruled that the state law fraud claim did not invoke “arising under” or “arising in” jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court because the state law fraud claim was not created or determined by the Bankruptcy Code, and could exist outside of bankruptcy.

The Supreme Court of Bermuda has confirmed once again its willingness to order Confidentiality Orders in cases that involve the administration of private trusts. In the 2018 case of In the Matter of the E Trust (the “E Trust”), Acting Justice, Shade Subair Williams (subsequently appointed as a Puisne Judge) reaffirmed previous rulings that private trust proceedings can be anonymized and heard privately in Chambers.

The Facts

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently held that a borrower is not entitled to attorney’s fees under the Pennsylvania Loan Interest Law (“Act 6”) relating to an affirmative defense raised in a mortgage foreclosure action that was subsequently discontinued without prejudice.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently held that claim preclusion does not bar a mortgagee from proceeding with a foreclosure complaint despite a prior litigation which resulted in a dismissal with prejudice if the subsequent litigation is based upon a default and acceleration which occurred after the initial foreclosure proceeding.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a party with a pecuniary interest affected by a bankruptcy court order satisfies the “person aggrieved” requirement for appellate standing even where the party fails to appear and object in the bankruptcy proceeding.

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the appeal for lack of standing and remanded the case.

The District Court of Appeal for the Fifth District of Florida recently denied a motion to reconsider an order awarding appellate attorney’s fees to borrowers who were the prevailing party on appeal, reversing judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of the mortgagee.

The District Court of Appeal for the Second District of Florida recently affirmed an order involuntarily dismissing an action to foreclose a second mortgage which secured a home equity line of credit.

In so ruling, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s holding that the promissory note for the relevant home equity line of credit was not admissible into evidence because it was nonnegotiable, and thus, not a self-authenticating instrument.