In judgment 297/2016 of September 22, 2016, by Commercial Court No. 6 of Madrid, the court rejects the appeal filed by a dissenting entity affected by a court-sanctioned refinancing agreement. The appeal argued the existence of a disproportionate sacrifice due to the standstill of the notarial enforcement of a pledge on shares already executed.

In its judgment 500/2016 of July 19, 2016, the Supreme Court interprets article 62.4 of the Insolvency Act, regulating the effects of contract resolution during insolvency:

If an agency agreement is resolved due to the agent being declared insolvent, the business owner must compensate the agent for clientele if the requirements under the Agency Act are met (the agent brought new clients or clearly increased transactions with existing clients, and the previous activity is still beneficial for the business owner). 

In its writ dated February 2, 2016, the First Instance Civil Court No. 38 of Barcelona raised a preliminary issue to the Court of Justice of the European Union. In that writ, it requested the EU court to determine whether the business practice of assigning or buying credits without offering consumers the possibility to settle the debt by paying the assignee the outstanding amount is in line with EU law.

The High Court in London handed down judgment on Part C of the Lehman Waterfall II Application on 5 October 2016.

The judgment examines the extent of creditors’ entitlements to Default Rate interest on debts arising under ISDA Master Agreements governed by English law and New York law. As some £4.4 billion of LBIE’s admitted claims arise under ISDA Master Agreements and the debts were outstanding for more than five years, this judgment will materially influence the amount of money which must be applied in satisfaction of creditors’ entitlements to statutory interest.

In Through the Looking Glass, Lewis Carroll’s sequel to Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, there is a famous exchange between Humpty Dumpty and Alice regarding the meaning of words. Toward the end of that dialogue, Alice asked Humpty Dumpty what he meant by the word “impenetrability.” Humpty Dumpty’s response was to not only give the word a meaning that would not be found in any dictionary, but to also expand the meaning he gave the word so that it required affirmative action on Alice’s part.

On August 3, 2016, Delaware Trust Company, as trustee for the EFIH first lien notes, filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, asking the Court to review the Energy Future Holding debtors’ settlement with the EFIH first lien noteholders.

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently faced a question of first impression: whether an allowed postpetition administrative expense claim can be used to set off preference liability. In concluding that it can, the court took a closer look at the nature of a preference claim.

Facts and Arguments

We’ve previously commented on this blog on a number of decisions (see: (i) Too Little, Too Late: Ninth Circuit Holds Confirmation Objection Insufficient to Revive Untimely Complaint Objecting to Dischargeability of Debt, (ii)

Recently, in GSE Environmental, Inc. v. Sorrentino (In re GSE Environmental, Inc.), on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that the Chief Executive Officer’s claim for unpaid compensation payable in stock constituted an equity security rather than a general unsecured claim.