Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code is a “safe harbor” provision which restricts a debtor’s ability to recover or “clawback” what would otherwise be “avoidable” payments made to creditors. In the recent case of Lightfoot v. MXEnergy Elec., Inc., 690 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2012), the Fifth U.S.

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A New York bankruptcy court recently rejected a debtor’s challenge to a consensual state court judgment (“Judgment”) in favor of mortgagee, General Electric Capital Corporation (“GECC”), that had accelerated a debt and obtained a prepetition foreclosure judgment against debtor, 410 East 92nd Street (the “Hotel”), in the amount of approximately $74 million. In re: Madison 92nd St. Associates LLC, 472 B.R. 189 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).

The British Columbia Supreme Court recently reviewed the considerations to be applied on an application by a secured creditor to lift a stay of proceedings granted in an initial order under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (the "CCAA"). In Re Azure Dynamics Corp.,¹ Madam Justice Fitzpatrick confirmed that the classic "doomed to fail" argument will not be persuasive where the applicant creditor is not prejudiced, and where the objectives of the CCAA are best served, by allowing the stay of proceedings to continue.

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On May 14, 2012, in 9-Ball Interests Inc. v. Traditional Life Sciences Inc.¹, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (the "Court") rendered another decision that demonstrates the importance of full disclosure and transparency in applications made to the Court.

The Delaware bankruptcy court in the KB Toys, Inc. cases recently held that a claims purchaser takes a claim subject to certain disabilities of the claim as held by the seller, regardless of whether the claim transfer is deemed a “sale” or an “assignment.” SeeIn re KB Toys, Inc., Case No. 04-10120 (KJC) (Bankr. Del. May 4, 2012). In so ruling, the Delaware court’s decision is somewhat at odds with the decision issued by the District Court for the Southern District of New York in the Enron bankruptcy cases. See Enron Corp. v.

After several years of unusually few corporate defaults, there has recently been an uptick in corporations failing to satisfy their bond and loan obligations. In a number of cases, the debts in question are part of multiple-lien or multi-tranche financing structures that incorporate complex subordination packages. The agreements at issue often go beyond merely subordinating rights to payments.

It is common for lenders to require borrowers to agree to pay a higher interest rate, known as the default rate, following an event of default under a loan. Some loan agreements also require the borrower to pay a fee in the event of a late payment. If the borrower files for bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code affords special protection to secured creditors with respect to collecting interest.

It is common knowledge that the Bankruptcy Code provides a debtor with a “fresh start” by allowing it to discharge prepetition claims. Similarly, section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee or debtor in possession to sell property of the estate “free and clear” of prior claims. These two concepts, while relatively straightforward, raise a fundamental question — when does a creditor hold a “claim” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code?

In the 2010 decision of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d. Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a plan proponent could deny a secured creditor the right to credit bid on its collateral when the sale was made pursuant to a plan of reorganization. That holding was a surprise to many given that secured creditors were specifically authorized to credit bid in stand-alone sales under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A year or so later, another circuit court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, came to the opposite conclusion.