Key takeaways
The Kemper/Lumbermens saga
To refresh everyone’s recollection, this is a report from Business Insurance from March 14, 2010:
Case Name & Citation
Greylag Goose Leasing 1410 Designated Activity Company v P.T. Garuda Indonesia Ltd [2023] NSWCA 134 per Bell CJ, Meagher JA, Kirk JA
Hyperlink
Date of Judgment
14 June 2023
Issues
Summary of Purdue Pharma, L.P. v, City of Grand Prairie (In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.), No. 22–110 – Bk (2d Cir. May 30, 2023)
A decision which insolvency practitioners will welcome in, Cathro, in the matter of Cubic Interiors NSW Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2023] FCA 694, the Federal Court clarified that s588FL of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) does not cover security interests granted by a security agreement made after the “critical time” as defined in s588FL(7) of the Act.
If at first you don’t succeed, try (and maybe try) again.
Basic Facts: Nomenclature and Numbers
When a previously reorganized debtor files a second chapter 11 case, courts and commentators refer to that continued entity’s second reorganization as a “chapter 22.” When a third case follows a second, “chapter 33” is a favored colloquialism; when a fourth, “chapter 44” is the name of choice. In practice, however, industry figures often denominate any repeat bankruptcy as a “chapter 22.”
In two cases in as many months, the Supreme Court tackled the application of sovereign immunity in two separate insolvency statutes. Two separate government-like entities suffered conflicting fates while the Court (arguably) employed the same analysis. How so?
Clear Statement Rule
In the latest decision of the Hong Kong court to consider the interplay between arbitration clauses and winding-up or bankruptcy petitions, on 22 May 2023, the Hon. Linda Chan J (the Judge) made a winding-up order against Simplicity & Vogue Retailing (HK) Co. Limited (the Company) and rejected the Company’s argument that the dispute over the underlying debt should be referred to arbitration.
Congress passed the operative texts without noticeable fanfare. From its enactment to today, section 363(k) has entitled a secured creditor to “credit bid” the full amount of the debt owed by a debtor in any sale of the underlying collateral pursuant to section 363(b). That this statutory bequest elicited little debate made imminent sense, for Congress had thereby codified one of secured creditors’ seemingly time-honored rights.
In my earlier posts I wrote about
and
Too many fish in the pond, too many electric birds not yet in the sky