The new law emphasises preventive restructuring, cross-border cooperation and equitable treatment of creditors

The European Union has recognised the need for harmonised insolvency laws across its member states and has taken a significant step forward with the introduction of the new EU Restructuring Directive ((EU) 2019/1023).

This directive aims to establish a common framework for insolvency proceedings, thereby enhancing cross-border cooperation and safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders involved.

Even if the statutory conditions for cramming down the votes of dissenting creditors has been met, the court retains a discretion to consider other factors

Certain statutory conditions need to be met in order for the court to sanction a plan at least one class of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) – referred to as the "cross-class cram down".

Demonstrating that dissenting creditors are no worse off under a contested restructuring plan than in the relevant alternative is an essential requirement for the court to exercise its power to sanction the plan

The power of the court to sanction a restructuring plan where one or more classes of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) is referred to as the "cross-class cram down".

Demonstrating what would most likely happen if a restructuring plan were not sanctioned is an essential element for the exercise of the court's discretion to cram down the votes of dissenting creditors

Restructuring plans under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) may provide an alternative for companies in financial distress to formal insolvency (see our previous Insight).

Restructuring plans can provide companies in the early stages of financial difficulty with a flexible alternative to entering a formal insolvency procedure

Under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), companies or groups encountering financial difficulties affecting their ability to carry on business can propose a compromise or arrangement (a restructuring plan) which mitigates or eliminates the effects of those financial difficulties.

Summary of Purdue Pharma, L.P. v, City of Grand Prairie (In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.), No. 22–110 – Bk (2d Cir. May 30, 2023)

If at first you don’t succeed, try (and maybe try) again.

Basic Facts: Nomenclature and Numbers

When a previously reorganized debtor files a second chapter 11 case, courts and commentators refer to that continued entity’s second reorganization as a “chapter 22.” When a third case follows a second, “chapter 33” is a favored colloquialism; when a fourth, “chapter 44” is the name of choice. In practice, however, industry figures often denominate any repeat bankruptcy as a “chapter 22.”

In two cases in as many months, the Supreme Court tackled the application of sovereign immunity in two separate insolvency statutes. Two separate government-like entities suffered conflicting fates while the Court (arguably) employed the same analysis. How so?

Clear Statement Rule

In the latest decision of the Hong Kong court to consider the interplay between arbitration clauses and winding-up or bankruptcy petitions, on 22 May 2023, the Hon. Linda Chan J (the Judge) made a winding-up order against Simplicity & Vogue Retailing (HK) Co. Limited (the Company) and rejected the Company’s argument that the dispute over the underlying debt should be referred to arbitration.

Congress passed the operative texts without noticeable fanfare. From its enactment to today, section 363(k) has entitled a secured creditor to “credit bid” the full amount of the debt owed by a debtor in any sale of the underlying collateral pursuant to section 363(b). That this statutory bequest elicited little debate made imminent sense, for Congress had thereby codified one of secured creditors’ seemingly time-honored rights.