Op 11 juli 2014 heeft de Hoge Raad bepaald dat vorderingen van een huurder tot het verrichten van onderhoud en tot het verschaffen van huurgenot op zichzelf steunvorderingen kunnen opleveren bij een faillissementsaanvraag (ECLI:NL:HR:2014:1681).

Met de inwerkingtreding van de Wet Claw back op 1 januari 2014 eindigde een periode waarin diverse ondernemingsrechtelijke wetten in werking traden, waaronder de Wet bestuur en toezicht en de Flex-BV wetgeving. Op dit moment bereidt de wetgever enkele nieuwe wetsontwerpen voor. In de meeste gevallen staat daarin de rol van bestuurders en toezichthouders centraal. Zo ook in het voorontwerp Wet bestuur en toezicht rechtspersonen en binnen het Wetgevingsprogramma Herijking Faillissementsrecht. 

Recent heeft het Hof van Cassatie de deur iets wijder opengezet voor schuldeisers van een failliete vennootschap om, hangende het faillissement, een individuele vordering in te stellen tegen de bestuurders van de gefailleerde (Cass. 5 september 2013, A.R. nr. C.12.0445.N,www.juridat.be). Concreet mocht de fiscus de niet-betaalde bedrijfsvoorheffing, die opgenomen was in het passief van het faillissement, de facto integraal verhalen op de bestuurders, op grond van foutaansprakelijkheid.

On 9 July 2013 a new law amending the Code of Commerce was enacted in Luxembourg (the “Law”). The Law introduces the right for a depositor to claim the recovery of intangible and non-fungible (i.e., identifiable and separable) goods from a bankrupt company. The parliamentary file aims clearly at including data from a bankrupt cloud computing service provider. The Law sets forth the different conditions to be fulfilled for the entitlement to claim intangible and non-fungible goods from a bankrupt company:

Given the commonality in today’s marketplace of complex corporate capital structures that employ multiple layers of secured debt, existing and potential creditors need to be increasingly aware of the rights and limitations provided for in subordination or intercreditor agreements. These agreements are often entered into between the existing lender or debt holder and a new lender. They often restrict the actions of subordinated lenders upon the debtor’s filing for bankruptcy protection, including denying their right to vote on the debtor’s plan of reorganization.

After a company has been declared bankrupt, the liquidator in charge of the bankrupt estate will process personal data on that bankrupt company’s behalf. The liquidator would then be considered a so-called data controller within the meaning of the Dutch Data Protection Act (DDPA).

A Dutch Court of Appeal recently upheld a lower court’s decision that a liquidator has the right to access data concerning the administration of a bankrupt company, the data of which are kept by a third party. It also held that this right, however, does not imply that the third party must provide the data in an orderly manner without being adequately compensated for it.

In a recent decision¹, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York found the standard for sealing under § 107 of the Bankruptcy Code was not met and declined to seal a settlement agreement, despite requests from the Chapter 7 trustee (the "Trustee") and the counterparties to the settlement agreement to do so. Confidentiality was an essential condition of the settlement. In addition, the United States trustee supported the motion to seal, arguing that the standard for sealing had been met.

Congress enacted the ordinary course of business defense to the avoidance of preferential transfers to protect recurring, customary transactions in order to encourage the continuation of business with and the extension of credit to a financially distressed customer.