"Does an insurance broker, after procuring an insurance policy for a developer on a construction project, owe a duty to apprise a subcontractor that was later added as an insured under that policy of the insurance company's subsequent insolvency?"

In this issue of first impression in California, the Fourth District Court of Appeals said "no." Pacific Rim Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Aon Risk Insurance Services West, Inc. --- Cal.Rptr.3d ----,2012 WL 621346 (Cal.App.4 Dist.).

Leisure Norwich (2) Ltd & Others v Luminar Lava Ignite Limited & Others - [2012] EWHC 951(Ch). Incurring liabilities to third parties is often necessary in order to carry out an effective administration of an insolvent company.

The UK Supreme Court's decision in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) caps the extensive litigation which developed in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (Lehman Brothers) almost four years ago.

It all began on 15 September 2008 when Lehman Brothers went into administration following what the Courts have referred to as its performance failures on 'a truly spectacular scale', foremost of which was the failure to protect its clients' monies.

There are some strict rules which apply when an individual is made bankrupt. Some of them were brought to the fore recently in the case of Floyd Foster v Davenport Lyons (A Firm) in the Chancery Division EWHC 275 (Ch).

The main cardinal rules are:

The recent case of F Options Ltd v Prestwood Properties Ltd concerned the setting aside of a transaction as a preference under section 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986.

A preference arises when a company's creditor is put in a better position than they would otherwise have been in the event of the company's insolvency. Transactions may be a preference whether or not the parties are connected, but where it can be shown that there is a connection within section 249 of the Insolvency Act 1986, two important advantages are gained:

The law allows any person to be treated as a director even though that person has not been formally appointed as a director. Such directors are known as de-facto directors. By contrast, a de jure director is a person who has been validly appointed as a director.

The recent case of Re Snelling House Ltd (In Liquidation) [2012] EWHC 440 (Ch) serves as a useful reminder to consider possible claims against de-facto directors who may be acting under the wrong impression that they are beyond reprehension.

The facts

In the recent case of RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 2012 WL 1912197 (May 29, 2012), the Supreme Court in a unanimous 8-0 opinion, delivered by Justice Scalia, held that the Bankruptcy Code statutory scheme mandates that secured creditors must be allowed to credit-bid in 363 sales of assets where the sale is incorporated into a plan of reorganization.

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a fraudulent transfer ruling in TOUSA, Inc.'s chapter 11 case with wide-ranging implications for the financing community. As discussed herein, this decision weakens protections for secured lenders, especially when extending credit to distressed borrowers.

The long awaited judgment in The Commissioners for her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v. Football League Limited, on the so called “football creditors’ rule” (the “Rule”) has been given.

This article only concerns itself with the issue of whether the Rule was or was not considered void on the grounds that it was contrary to the pari passu principle and the anti-deprivation rule and not on the fairness of the Rule itself.

BESTrustees v Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander [2012] EWHC 629 (Ch) (High Court Chancery Division 16 March 2012)

Background