Fulltext Search

This article was first published on India Business Law Journal on 22 June 2023.

In M Suresh Kumar Reddy v Canara Bank and Ors, the Supreme Court clarified that its observations inVidarbha Industries Power Limited v Axis Bank Limited were restricted to the particular facts of that case. Therefore, except in exceptional circumstances, National Company Law Tribunals (NCLT) must admit applications under section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), once the existence of a debt and default is established.

In the recent case of Re Avanti Communications Limited (in administration) (Re Avanti), the court considered the nature of fixed and floating charges. Whether a charge is fixed or floating has implications for both lenders and administrators in terms of determining to what extent a chargor can recover from the charged assets and to what extent a borrower can deal with its assets.

Background of case:

In MOAC Mall Holdings v. Transform Holdco, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed whether Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code―which limits the effect of certain appeals on orders authorizing the sale or lease of bankruptcy estate property―is a jurisdictional provision.

In Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved confusion in the lower courts over the scope and application of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), which prohibits debtors from discharging debt through bankruptcy when such debt was obtained as a result of fraudulent actions.

The Department of Telecommunications is seeking to overhaul the law governing the provision of telecommunication services through the Draft Telecommunication Bill, 2022. The Bill also seeks to govern the provision of telecom services and, or, availability of network during insolvency proceedings in respect of a telecom licensee or assignee. While the DoT’s rationale for this is understandable, the proposed provisions may conflict with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

This article examines the NCLT and NCLAT’s power to exercise contempt jurisdiction under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and the inconsistent approach taken by different benches.

Although the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) was initially hailed as a welcome reform that would enable timebound and effective insolvency resolution, its tenure has been fraught with issues and uncertainty. One of the issues that remains open is the power to punish for contempt under the Code.

In In re Roberts, No. 22-10521, 2022 WL 4592086 (Bankr. D. Colo. Sept. 23, 2022), the Bankruptcy Court of the District of Colorado (the “Bankruptcy Court”) held that a Debtor’s alleged ownership interest in cannabis-related companies did not require a dismissal of the case and that a Chapter 7 trustee could administer the Debtor’s assets. This represents a significant change from prior decisions from this Court, which has usually dismissed any bankruptcy case involving cannabis.

Background

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was enacted, amongst others, to facilitate timely insolvency resolution. While the Supreme Court has always upheld the sanctity of timelines under the Code for corporate insolvency resolution, it has held the prescribed timelines for actions prior to the commencement of the corporate insolvency process as merely directory. This article explores the impact of such decisions on the proceedings under the Code which already suffer from inordinate delays.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was enacted to facilitate insolvency resolution in a timebound manner, and maximise value realisation for stakeholders. Although it has been amended 6 times since its notification, issues remain. As the Legislature appears set to amend the Code once again, this article examines stakeholders’ issues and explores the issues the amendments may address.

InBailey Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Republic Bus. Credit, LLC, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 3502 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2021), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas clarified how aggressive a secured lender can be when enforcing its rights. The 145-page opinion details how a lending arrangement went “terribly wrong” and why awarding millions in damages was warranted.

Background