The landmark decision in Design Studio¹ introduces the US rescue financing concept of "roll-ups" to Singapore. This is the first case to consider the appropriateness of the roll-up feature in Singapore and is a pragmatic decision that is guided by a careful balance between the protection of creditors' interests and the rehabilitation of the debtor. This case also clarifies that super priority is not solely for new money financings.

The Design Studio case and the super priority regime

In a recent decision, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that claim disallowance issues under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code "travel with" the claim, and not with the claimant. Declining to follow a published district court decision from the same federal district, the bankruptcy court found that section 502(d) applies to disallow a transferred claim regardless of whether the transferee acquired its claim through an assignment or an outright sale. See In re Firestar Diamond, 615 B.R. 161 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Nearly two years after it was first passed in Parliament on 1 October 2018, the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act (“IRDA”) has now come into operation on 30 July 2020. The IRDA not only unifies Singapore’s legislation in relation to personal and corporate insolvency and debt restructuring, but also introduces significant changes to the present regime.

In this update, we will highlight nine key changes of the new provisions of the IRDA.

1. Restriction of Ipso Facto Clauses in Insolvency/Restructuring Proceedings

InIn re Juarez, 603 B.R. 610 (9th Cir. BAP 2019), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed a question of first impression in the circuit with respect to property that is exempt from creditor reach: it adopted the view that, under the "new value exception" to the "absolute priority rule," an individual Chapter 11 debtor intending to retain such property need not make a "new value" contribution covering the value of the exemption.

Background

If you are an aviation professional in the COVID-19 era, you are likely learning about, or reacquainting yourself with, the restructuring process.

The new Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill will introduce new provisions to protect a company from suppliers wishing to terminate supply contracts or invoking more draconian terms when the company is entering into certain insolvency procedures, a CVA, or a new restructuring plan or moratorium (as introduced by the Bill), (each an “Insolvency Procedure”).

The purpose behind the new provisions is to maximise the possibility of a company being rescued or being able to sell its business as a going concern by helping it to trade through an Insolvency Procedure.

The landlord argued that the force majeure clause did not apply at all for three primary reasons. The Bankruptcy Court rejected each of the landlord’s arguments.

Last week the UK government introduced the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill in Parliament.

The main objective of the Bill is to provide businesses with the flexibility and space needed to continue to trade during this difficult time caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. That said, the provisions around the new moratorium and the new restructuring plan proposal have been under consideration for a few years.

The Bill’s measures can be split into three categories:

Amendments to Article 9.1 of the Insolvency Law¹ ("Law 149-FZ") came into effect on 24 April 2020. The amendments provide that the benefit of the insolvency filing moratorium can be waived (the "moratorium waiver"). In addition, on 21 April 2020, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation ("Russian SC") adopted clarifications (the "Clarifications"),² which, in particular, explain that the moratorium will apply if the debtor meets the formal criterion of being included in the list of persons covered by the moratorium ("protected debtors").

In In re Palladino, 942 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2019), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed whether a debtor receives “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for paying his adult child’s college tuition. The Palladino court answered this question in the negative, thereby contributing to the growing circuit split regarding the avoidability of debtors’ college tuition payments for their adult children as constructively fraudulent transfers.

Background