Arthur C. Clarke famously observed: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.” Our regulatory, legislative, and judicial systems illustrate this principle whenever new technology exceeds the limits of our existing legal framework and collective legal imagination. Cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin, has proven particularly “magical” in the existing framework of bankruptcy law, which has not yet determined quite what bitcoin is—a currency, an intangible asset, a commodity contract, or something else entirely.
Arthur C. Clarke famously observed: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.” Our regulatory, legislative, and judicial systems illustrate this principle whenever new technology exceeds the limits of our existing legal framework and collective legal imagination. Cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin, has proven particularly “magical” in the existing framework of bankruptcy law, which has not yet determined quite what bitcoin is—a currency, an intangible asset, a commodity contract, or something else entirely.
With the holiday season now upon us, analysts are closely watching the restaurant industry, particularly the casual dining segment. Reminiscent of the conditions in 2008-2009, many are speculating whether the increase in online consumer shopping that served as a catalyst for the current “Retail Apocalypse” will reduce crucial holiday shopper foot traffic and push some teetering dining chains over the edge.
Courts and professionals have wrestled for years with the appropriate approach to use in setting the interest rate when a debtor imposes a chapter 11 plan on a secured creditor and pays the creditor the value of its collateral through deferred payments under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Bankruptcy Code. Secured lenders gained a major victory on October 20, 2017, when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a market rate of interest is preferred to a so-called “formula approach” in chapter 11, when an efficient market exists.
Here is the scenario: You are a creditor. You hold clear evidence of a debt that is not disputed by the borrower, an individual. That evidence of debt could be in the form of a note, credit agreement or simply an invoice. You originated the debt, or perhaps instead it was transferred to you — it does not matter for this scenario. At some point the borrower fails to pay on the debt when due. For whatever reason, months or even years pass before you initiate collection efforts.
In Ex Parte Nell and Others NO 2014 (6) SA 545 (GP) (28 July 2014), the board of a company passed a resolution placing it in business rescue in accordance with s129 of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Companies Act). In terms of this section, a financially distressed company may, without any prior judicial oversight or consultation with its creditors, achieve a general moratorium against legal proceedings.
On July 19 2017, the National Treasury published the Draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2017. The bill proposes to clarify the tax implications that arise when a person assumes contingent liabilities under the corporate reorganisation rules contained in Sections 41 to 47 of the Income Tax Act (58/1962).
Editors’ Note: The Supreme Court’s Jevic ruling last spring remains a treasure trove of bankruptcy theory, suitable for the novice bankruptcy student and highly instructional for those of us who have practiced in chapter 11 for years. We at The Bankruptcy Cave like it so much that we will be offering a few more posts in upcoming weeks on the lower courts’ interpretation of Jevic since the spring, the continued efforts in Delaware to sidestep Jevic, and other important learning from the case.
A Melomed Finance (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Harris Jeffrey (SGHC Case no: 2016/A5028) (Judgment handed down 23 June 2017)
The South Gauteng High Court, sitting as a court of appeal, recently handed down a judgment to the effect that a verbal acknowledgement of debt when made at an enquiry held into the affairs of a company, in terms of s417 and s418 of the Companies Act, No 61 of 1973 (s417 enquiry), can be used as evidence in subsequent civil litigation to recover the amount so acknowledged.
Since 1956, legislation has required suretyship agreements to be embodied in a written document. A suretyship agreement involves three parties; simplistically if A does not pay B, then C will. C will step into the shoes of A and perform A’s obligations for them.