Arthur C. Clarke famously observed: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.” Our regulatory, legislative, and judicial systems illustrate this principle whenever new technology exceeds the limits of our existing legal framework and collective legal imagination. Cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin, has proven particularly “magical” in the existing framework of bankruptcy law, which has not yet determined quite what bitcoin is—a currency, an intangible asset, a commodity contract, or something else entirely.

With the holiday season now upon us, analysts are closely watching the restaurant industry, particularly the casual dining segment. Reminiscent of the conditions in 2008-2009, many are speculating whether the increase in online consumer shopping that served as a catalyst for the current “Retail Apocalypse” will reduce crucial holiday shopper foot traffic and push some teetering dining chains over the edge.

Courts and professionals have wrestled for years with the appropriate approach to use in setting the interest rate when a debtor imposes a chapter 11 plan on a secured creditor and pays the creditor the value of its collateral through deferred payments under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Bankruptcy Code. Secured lenders gained a major victory on October 20, 2017, when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a market rate of interest is preferred to a so-called “formula approach” in chapter 11, when an efficient market exists.

In New Zealand, a court may appoint a liquidator to a company if, among other reasons, it is satisfied that the company is unable to pay its debts.[1] Unlike other jurisdictions, that assessment is focused only on cashflow, rather than balance sheet, insolvency.

Here is the scenario: You are a creditor. You hold clear evidence of a debt that is not disputed by the borrower, an individual. That evidence of debt could be in the form of a note, credit agreement or simply an invoice. You originated the debt, or perhaps instead it was transferred to you — it does not matter for this scenario. At some point the borrower fails to pay on the debt when due. For whatever reason, months or even years pass before you initiate collection efforts.

Ranolf Company Limited (Ranolf) was created for the sole purpose of acting as a trustee of the Ranolf Trust (Trust). This was the only activity Ranolf performed and its only asset was its right of recourse to the Trust assets under indemnity.

Ranolf was put into liquidation in 2014. Earlier this year, Ranolf brought this proceeding in the High Court seeking various orders to enable it to recourse to the Trust property to meet the claims of its creditors and its liquidators' costs.

In McCollum v Thompson, the Court of Appeal partly quashed the orders of the High Court (previously reported in our March 2016 insolvency update).

The director and shareholders of Rayland Investment Ltd (in liq) (the Company) applied to terminate the Company's liquidation. The Court found it appropriate to make that order. At issue, however, was the remuneration claimed by Mr Norrie, the Company's liquidator, which the Court reduced from $39,128 to $15,559.

Mr Norrie was not entitled to remuneration for unnecessary preliminary steps such as consenting to appointment by affidavit and carrying out property searches.

The case of Hollis & Somerville v Total Debt Solutions (2009) Limited concerned an application by the liquidators of a company for directions that the liquidators could have recourse to all trust monies received by the company to meet their fees and expenses incurred in the liquidation.

The High Court recently granted an application under s 292 Companies Act 1993 to set aside substantial payments made on behalf of Northern Crest Investment Limited (in liquidation) (NCI) to satisfy a debt owed to Robt. Jones Holdings Limited (RJH).