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On March 20, 2014, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued an important decision in Stoebner v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (In re LGI Energy Solutions Inc.), No. 12-3899, Slip Op. (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 2014) that expands the scope of the “subsequent new value” defense in lawsuits seeking to clawback alleged preference payments.

In a recent decision that has captured the attention of the U.S. secondary loan market, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington starkly concluded that hedge funds “that acquire distressed debt and engage in predatory lending” were not eligible buyers of a loan under a loan agreement because they were not “financial institutions” within the Court’s understanding of the phrase.

On March 7, the Spanish government reformed its bankruptcy law to encourage companies to restructure their debt and avoid liquidation. The decree is one part of an ongoing reform program intended to strengthen and stabilize the Spanish financial sector.  The reforms provide stronger incentives for lenders to accept write-offs, maturity extensions, and debt forgiveness for struggling companies. The new rules also reduce the majority of creditors needed to vote for a restructuring.

It seems that most bankruptcy decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court involve individual debtors, and the Supreme Court’s latest opinion is no exception. Even though the decision is not in a business bankruptcy case, it examines the bankruptcy court’s powers under Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

A recent decision in the bankruptcy case of Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al. has called into question a long-held belief that secured creditors hold dear: that debt purchased at a discount can nonetheless be credit bid at its full face amount at a collateral sale. While it remains to be seen how other courts will interpret Fisker, this decision has the potential to restrict participation in Bankruptcy Code section 363 sales and dampen liquidity in the robust secondary markets.

Last Friday, Judge Sleet of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware denied Hybrid Tech Holdings LLC’s appeal of the Delaware bankruptcy court’s decision in In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc. et al, to (i) cap Hybrid Tech’s credit bid for Fisker Automotive’s assets, and (ii) require that the assets be sold via a public auction rather than directly to Hybrid Tech in a private sale.

In a departure from other bankruptcy courts in the Third Circuit and her own recent prior opinion, U.S. Bankruptcy Chief Judge Mary France of the Middle District of Pennsylvania broadly interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 2 (2011), and held that a bankruptcy court lacks the constitutional authority to issue a final judgment in any fraudulent transfer action where the defendant (i) has not filed a proof of claim and (ii) has not consented to the bankruptcy judge entering a final judgment on the matter. 

The Bankruptcy Code provides debtors in possession and other potential plan proponents with considerable flexibility to implement a plan under chapter 11. An important consideration is the preservation of potentially valuable causes of action held by the estate and the provision of a vehicle for post-confirmation prosecution of such claims.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently issued an important decision for administrative creditors in chapter 11 cases and chapter 7 cases alike.  In In re National Litho, LLC, 2013 WL 2303786 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.