The rapid growth in derivatives as hedging instruments, particularly through equity swaps, credit default swaps ("CDS") and loan credit default swaps ("LCDS"), has challenged fundamental assumptions underlying corporate governance law, federal shareholder disclosure requirements and bankruptcy law. Corporate law has long relied on a "one share one vote" model, which presumes that a shareholder's economic interests in a corporation are inextricably linked to their voting power.
Imagine that a critical part of your business is dependent on a software program that you license from a software supplier. This scenario is not that hard to imagine, because in fact most businesses and other organizations are indeed reliant on licensed software – it is simply a fact of life in the computer age.
We have written in the past about the risks to investors in troubled companies from trustees in bankruptcy seeking recoveries for the estate on theories such as insider trading, breaches of duty and conflicts of interest. While those risks remain real, a recent decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals should provide some restraint on bankruptcy trustees.
A recent ruling in the Delphi Corporation, et al. ("Delphi") bankruptcy case calls into question the effectiveness of power of attorney provisions found in many claim purchase agreements. Specifically, on February 26, 2008, United States Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain, presiding over the Delphi bankruptcy proceeding, held that claims purchasers could not submit cure notices in reliance on powers of attorney.
Delphi Sent Cure Notices Only to Contract Counterparties
Owners of bank loan participations take on two kinds of credit risk: (i) the borrower’s failure to pay the underlying bank loan, and (ii) the loan participation grantor’s bankruptcy. The first risk is well understood and carefully analyzed in each transaction. This memorandum focuses on the second kind of credit risk assumed by a participant -- grantor insolvency.
On December 23, 2007, the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee for Third-Party Structured Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) announced that an ‘agreement in principle’ had been reached for a restructuring of $33 billion of approximately $35 billion of Canadian ABCP. The repayment of this debt had been frozen pursuant to a standstill created by the ‘Montreal Accord’ as of August 16, 2007.
Recently, a number of high profile cases have emerged involving the application of material adverse change ("MAC") provisions, primarily in the context of leveraged buyouts.2 This week, the application of MAC clauses to a financing commitment arose in the context of the Solutia Inc. ("Solutia") bankruptcy proceeding. On February 6, 2008, Solutia filed an adversary proceeding against certain lenders (the "Lenders")3 seeking to enforce a commitment to provide $2 billion in exit financing.
Following a recent ruling in the Delphi Corporation bankruptcy case approving cure notices and cure claims procedures, purchasers of unsecured trade claims originating out of executory contracts or unexpired leases should take special precautions to protect their rights or risk impairment or loss of such claims to the extent they become cure claims.
On December 14, 2007, Bill C-12 was given Royal Assent. The Bill involves a comprehensive reform of Canada’s insolvency system. A key component of these reforms was the creation of the Wage Earner Protection Program (WEPP). The WEPP provides statutory wage protection for workers when a) their employer becomes bankrupt or subject to a receivership, and b) their employment is terminated as a result.
All businesses know that one key to profitability is risk management. Particularly in such industries as oil and natural gas, eligible financial contracts have emerged as an invaluable tool to hedge the risk associated with volatile foreign currency exchange, interest rates and commodity prices. Indeed, a large business has developed proffering over-the-counter derivatives (or ‘swaps’) and standardized exchange-traded derivatives (or ‘futures’) to do just that.