Highlights

Counterparties should continue to follow their current contractual obligations

Silicon Valley Bank’s parent company bankruptcy filing will not impact contractual rights

Counterparties should be vigilant and consider alternate financing arrangements

The question of who is entitled to payment of compensation for PPI where a debtor has been discharged from his/her Protected Trust Deed (PTD) had given rise to conflicting judicial decisions in Scotland. In our previous article, we highlighted the uncertainty created following the decision of Sheriff Reid in the case ofDonnelly v The Royal Bank of Scotland (Donnelly) and the decision of Lord Jones in Dooneen Limited, t/a Mcginnes Associates and Douglas Davidson v David Mond (Dooneen).

The first Monday of each October marks the beginning of a fresh term for the Supreme Court of the United States. As the 2016 term approaches, the court’s docket has already begun to fill with cases that will impact commercial practitioners. While the court will continue to accept additional cases throughout the upcoming term, it has already agreed to hear at least five cases that may have significant implications for commercial lawyers throughout the country.

The question of who is entitled to payment of compensation for PPI where a debtor has been discharged from his/her Protected Trust Deed (PTD) has given rise to conflicting judicial decisions in Scotland. In our previous article, we highlighted the uncertainty created following the decision of Sheriff Reid in the case of Donnelly v The Royal Bank of Scotland and the decision of Lord Jones in Dooneen Limited, t/a Mcginnes Associates and Douglas Davidson v David Mond.

It is estimated that there were almost 40,000 Protected Trust Deeds (“PTD”) entered into between 2005 and 2010. Similar to an IVA, a PTD is a voluntary arrangement in which the debtor conveys his estate to an insolvency practitioner (“the Trustee”) to be held on trust for the benefit of creditors. A large number of those who enter into a PTD do so because of borrowing that they have incurred on credit cards.

On October 27, 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that even inadvertent mistakes in UCC filings count, and the burden rests on the filing party to detect errors, and not on affected parties who come across them in a search. This ruling upsets a 2013 decision of a bankruptcy court and will ultimately determine the character of a $1.5 billion security interest in the General Motors (GM) bankruptcy.

Background

Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Illinois mortgages entered prior to the amendment of 765 ILCS 5/11 need not strictly conform to the form presented in the statute. In re Crane, --- F.3d ---, 2013 WL 6731850 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013). However, the court’s decision in Crane, considered as a whole, serves as a reminder to secured lenders to closely examine the contents of their mortgages and the requirements of applicable state law.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the decisions of the courts below and held in an unpublished opinion that a secured lender’s credit bid at a Michigan foreclosure sale extinguished all of the Chapter 13 debtor’s indebtedness to the lender, thereby precluding the lender from executing on a prepetition foreclosure judgment obtained against the debtor in Wisconsin. State Bank of Florence v. Miller (In re Miller), 2013 WL 425342 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 2013).

In a previous Alert that we published in July 2012 entitled “Michigan Court Authorizes Receiver Sale of Real Property Free and Clear of Redemption Rights,” we reported on a decision of a Michigan trial court in Ottawa County, Michigan permitting a state-court receiver to sell real property free and clear of a mortgagor’s redemption rights.

Like the common law of most other states, Michigan law generally grants to a court-appointed receiver a first priority claim in the receivership proceeding for payment of the receiver’s fees and expenses incurred in that proceeding. See, e.g., In re Dissolution of Henry Smith Floral Co., 260 Mich. 299, 244 N.W. 480 (1932); Cohen v. Cohen, 125 Mich. App. 206, 335 N.W.2d 661 (1983).