The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois recently held that an Illinois mortgage is subject to avoidance in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) unless the mortgage contains among other things, (i) the amount of the debt, (ii) the maturity date of the debt, and (iii) the underlying interest rate. Richardson v. The Gifford State Bank (In re Crane), Adv. Pro. No. 11-9067 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.).
The common law has long recognized a secured creditor’s duty to provide reasonable notice to borrowers before enforcing its security and appointing a receiver. The practical importance of this has become less significant since the codification of the principle of reasonable notice in section 244 of theBankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”). However, in the recent case of Bank of Montreal v.
In their study published in February's issue of The Quarterly Journal of Economics, “Long-Run Impacts of Unions on Firms: New Evidence from Financial Markets, 1961–1999,” Princeton University Professor David Lee and University of California Professor Alexandre Mas estimated that an “average union effect on the equity value of the firm equivalent to $40,000 per unionized worker.” The professors noted that the loss was a combination of a transfer of wealth to workers and inefficiencies caused by the unions.
- Introduction
On Feb. 29, 2012, a Michigan citizens’ group opposed to the State of Michigan’s emergency financial manager law (officially entitled “Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act,” MCL §§ 141.1501 et seq. and referred to herein as the “Act”), filed petitions to place the issue of the Act’s rejection on the state ballot in November.
A proposed bill entitled the Nonrecourse Mortgage Loan Act and recently introduced to the Senate for the State of Michigan would regulate the use and enforceability of certain loan covenants in non-recourse commercial transactions. Presumably, the bill, Senate Bill No. 992 introduced on Feb. 29, 2012 and referred to the Committee on Economic Development, is in reaction to a recent decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals finding a guarantor liable for a deficiency claim notwithstanding the non-recourse nature of the loan. See Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Cherryland Mall Ltd.
In the midst of the ongoing restructurings of Nortel and AbitibiBowater, the New Democrats introduced Bill C-501 in the spring of 2010 to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”) and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) with the goal of better protecting employees’ interests in the context of formal insolvency proceedings, including pension interests. However, Bill C-501 did not become law.
Introduction
In “True Lease v. Security Lease – Is the Distinction Still Relevant?” which appeared in the June 2008 issue of Collateral Matters, Jill Fraser discussed a 2007 amendment to the Personal Property Security Act (Ontario) (the “PPSA”) and whether or not the distinction between a true lease and a security lease was still relevant in light of that amendment.
Section 11.01 of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) states that no order under Section 11 or 11.02 of the CCAA has the effect of: (a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, the use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided after the order is made; or (b) requiring the further advance of money or credit.
As most are aware by now, the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “OCA”) recently caused alarm by finding that claims of pension plan beneficiaries ranked higher than the super-priority debtor-in-possession financing charge (the “DIP Charge”) created by the amended initial order (the “CCAA Order”) in the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) proceedings of the Indalex group of Canadian companies (collectively, “Indalex”).
During the past 14 months, courts in Ontario have rendered three decisions dealing with the application of limitation periods to claims for fraudulent conveyances or preferences. A “limitation period” is a period of time, specified in a statute, within which a plaintiff must commence a court proceeding to seek a remedy. Otherwise, the claim is said to be “statute-barred” and an action to enforce the claim will be dismissed.
The recent decisions have brought some clarity to the law in this area, but have left other questions unanswered.
Background