On March 20, 2014, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued an important decision in Stoebner v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (In re LGI Energy Solutions Inc.), No. 12-3899, Slip Op. (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 2014) that expands the scope of the “subsequent new value” defense in lawsuits seeking to clawback alleged preference payments.
On March 7, the Spanish government reformed its bankruptcy law to encourage companies to restructure their debt and avoid liquidation. The decree is one part of an ongoing reform program intended to strengthen and stabilize the Spanish financial sector. The reforms provide stronger incentives for lenders to accept write-offs, maturity extensions, and debt forgiveness for struggling companies. The new rules also reduce the majority of creditors needed to vote for a restructuring.
A lingering misperception among American businesspersons and some commercial lawyers is that it is a fool’s errand to commence an insolvency case seeking reorganization in a European nation because those national laws prescribe liquidation rather than rehabilitation. These business leaders often dismiss out-of-hand insolvency relief on the continent for a troubled European subsidiary and elect to wind up the company’s affairs outside the judicial system.
It seems that most bankruptcy decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court involve individual debtors, and the Supreme Court’s latest opinion is no exception. Even though the decision is not in a business bankruptcy case, it examines the bankruptcy court’s powers under Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Last Friday, Judge Sleet of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware denied Hybrid Tech Holdings LLC’s appeal of the Delaware bankruptcy court’s decision in In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc. et al, to (i) cap Hybrid Tech’s credit bid for Fisker Automotive’s assets, and (ii) require that the assets be sold via a public auction rather than directly to Hybrid Tech in a private sale.
On January 14, 2014, Judge Robert E.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently limited the ability of a secured creditor to credit bid for substantially all of the debtors’ assets because (i) the credit bid would chill, or even freeze, the bidding process, (ii) the proposed expedited private sale pursuant to a credit bid would be inconsistent with notions of fairness in the bankruptcy process, and (iii) the amount of the secured claim was uncertain. In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., Case No. 13-13087 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014).
Section 1111(b) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) is one of its least understood provisions, primarily due to its somewhat opaque language. This Code subsection is divided into two distinct but related parts. The first part, section 1111(b)(1), provides that a nonrecourse secured claim in a Chapter 11 case will be treated “as if such holder had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim, whether or not such holder has such recourse” subject to two exceptions.
In a departure from other bankruptcy courts in the Third Circuit and her own recent prior opinion, U.S. Bankruptcy Chief Judge Mary France of the Middle District of Pennsylvania broadly interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 2 (2011), and held that a bankruptcy court lacks the constitutional authority to issue a final judgment in any fraudulent transfer action where the defendant (i) has not filed a proof of claim and (ii) has not consented to the bankruptcy judge entering a final judgment on the matter.
The Bankruptcy Code provides debtors in possession and other potential plan proponents with considerable flexibility to implement a plan under chapter 11. An important consideration is the preservation of potentially valuable causes of action held by the estate and the provision of a vehicle for post-confirmation prosecution of such claims.