A secured lender's "mere retention of property [after a pre-bankruptcy repossession] does not violate" the automatic stay provision [362(a) (3)] of the Bankruptcy Code, held a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court on Jan. 14, 2021. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 2021 WL 125106, 4 ( Jan. 14, 2021). Reversing the Seventh Circuit's affirmance of a bankruptcy court judgment holding a secured lender in contempt for violating the automatic stay, the Court resolved "a split" in the Circuits. Id. at 2. The Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuits had agreed with the Seventh Circuit.

Brazos Electric Power Cooperative recently filed for Chapter 11 relief in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, weeks after the February ice storm severely disrupted Texas’s electricity supply and prices. Brazos filed for bankruptcy in part to shield its member cooperatives and consumers from liability for invoices totaling over $2.1 billion from the Electric Reliability Council of Texas.

On Oct. 27, 2020, Judge Marvin Isgur for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas held that (1) a make-whole premium was not interest or unmatured interest and thus not subject to disallowance, (2) a make-whole claim was enforceable as liquidated damages under New York law and (3) the solvent debtor exception survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code and the Noteholders were entitled to postpetition interest at the contractual default rate.

The bankruptcy trustee of a bank holding company was not entitled to a consolidated corporate tax refund when a bank subsidiary had incurred losses generating the refund, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on May 26, 2020. Rodriguez v. FDIC (In re United Western Bancorp, Inc.), 2020 WL 2702425(10th Cir May 26, 2020). On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit, as directed, applied "Colorado law to resolve" the question of "who owns the federal tax refund." Id., at 2.

A lender’s state law tort claims against “non-debtor third-parties for tortious interference with a contract” were “not preempted” by “federal bankruptcy law,” held the New York Court of Appeals on Nov. 24, 2020. Sutton 58 Associates LLC v. Pilevsky, 2020 WL 6875979, *1 (N.Y. Ct. Appeals, Nov. 24, 2020) (4-3). In a split opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of a lender’s complaint against the debtors’ non-debtor insiders. The lender will still have to prove its case at trial.

The Asserted Claims

The highly anticipated Supreme Court decision in Bresco Electrical Services Ltd (in Liquidation) v Michael J Lonsdale [2020] UKSC 25 has endorsed the use of adjudication in the context of insolvency set off, substantially reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal.

Suppliers are now prevented from terminating many contracts and supplies of goods or services if the customer is subject to a ‘relevant insolvency procedure’ (such as going into administration, CVA, or appointing a provisional liquidator).

This follows the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, which came into force on 26 June. Although Coronavirus has accelerated the passing of the Act, these are set to be permanent changes.

What can’t suppliers do?*

DAC Beachcroft's GC Horizon Scanner is a selection of legal and regulatory developments that we consider are the most interesting and relevant to General Counsel, senior managers and professionals, allowing them to keep abreast of issues which are likely to impact their business, prepare for opportunities and mitigate risks.

The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 came into force on 26 June bringing in measures to alleviate the burden on businesses during the Covid-19 pandemic and allow directors to focus their efforts on continuing to operate. In this article we consider the temporary changes to the wrongful trading regime and other key changes introduced by the Act.

Temporary wrongful trading relaxation

In a decision of first impression entered on June 3, 2020, a Chicago bankruptcy court (“Court”) held that a restaurant tenant was excused from paying a significant portion of its rent under the force majeure provisions of its lease because of the governor’s executive order prohibiting in-house dining during the COVID-19 pandemic.[1] This decision is highly significant for landlords and tenants whose ability to service their clients has similarly been restricted by government orders.