Becoming the first Court of Appeals to address an issue that has divided the bankruptcy and district courts, the Ninth Circuit adopted a forceful view of Stern v. Marshall,1 to hold in In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.2 that absent the parties’ consent, the limitations imposed by Article III of the Constitution deprive a bankruptcy judge of the constitutional authority to enter judgment on fraudulent transfer claims brought against parties who have not filed proofs of claim.

In Re Sino-Forest Corporation¹, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the interpretation of “equity claims” employed by Justice Morawetz of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List).

Law Decree No. 83/2012, providing “Urgent Measures for the Country's Development”

Law Decree No. 83 of 22 June 2012 (the “Decree”), effective as from 26 June 2012 and converted into law with amendments1, has introduced important measures aimed at stimulating the Italian economy (also referred to as “Decreto Sviluppo”).

The Decree, consisting of seventy articles, sets forth a heterogeneous set of rules, including, among other provisions, significant amendments to the Italian Bankruptcy Law.2

In a surprising decision certain to reinvigorate the ongoing debate about the scope of Stern v. Marshall, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a broad view of Stern and held that the structural nature of the limitations imposed on bankruptcy courts by Article III of the Constitution could not be waived by a party’s failure to object at the trial court level. The decision, Waldman v. Stone, 2012 WL 5275241 (6th Cir. Oct.

Prior to the 2009 amendments (the “Amendments”) to the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”),¹  courts exercising jurisdiction under that statute could, in the appropriate circumstances, approve “roll up” debtor in possession (“DIP”) financing arrangements.  While it can take different forms, in essence, a “roll up” DIP loan facility is an arrangement whereby an existing lender refinances or repays its pre-filing loan by way of borrowings under the new DIP loan facility.  The priority status of the charge granted by the court to secure the DIP

On June 13, 2012, the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Texas in In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. (“Vitro SAB”) declined to recognize and enforce an order issued by the Federal District Court for Civil and Labor Matters for the State of León, Mexico, which approved Vitro SAB’s reorganization plan in its Mexican insolvency proceeding (known as a concurso mercantil proceeding). Vitro S.A.B. v. ACP Master Fund, Ltd., et al. (In re Vitro S.A.B.), Case No. 11–33335 (HDH), 2012 WL 2138112 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 13, 2012).

Admonishing that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be decided based on whether a plaintiff's complaint is plausible rather than how plausible it is, which was the district's view in granting a dismissal motion, the Second Circuit, in Anderson News, L.L.C. v. American Media, Inc.,[1] declared improper the district court's denial of leave to file a proposed amended complaint and vacated the dismissal.  

On May 29, 2012, the Supreme Court in In RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC (“RadLAX”) held that a Chapter 11 reorganization plan that proposes the sale of encumbered assets free and clear of liens must honor the secured creditor’s right to credit bid its claim in order to be confirmed under the “fair and equitable” standard of the Bankruptcy Code.

In the Kitchener Frame Ltd¹ decision, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) confirmed that third-party releases in proposals made under the BIA² are permitted. In doing so, the Court relied on the principle that the BIA and CCAA³ ought to be read and interpreted, harmoniously. Finally, the Court sanctioned a consolidated proposal on the basis it met the requirements set out in section 59(2) of the BIA.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) has confirmed that historical environmental remediation obligations will not automatically take priority over the claims of other creditors in an insolvency, even where those obligations are framed in the form of regulatory orders.