In a decision that may create serious problems for bankruptcy case administration, the Supreme Court this morning invalidated part of the Bankruptcy Court jurisdictional scheme. Stern v. Marshall, No. 10-179, 564 U.S. ___ (June 23, 2011). Specifically, the Court held that the Bankruptcy Courts cannot issue final judgments on garden variety state law claims that are asserted as counterclaims by the debtor or trustee against creditors who have filed proofs of claim in the bankruptcy case.

On April 26, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted amended Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2019 (“Rule 2019”). Rule 2019 governs disclosure requirements for groups and committees that consist of or represent multiple creditors or equity security holders, as well as lawyers and other entities that represent multiple creditors or equity security holders, acting in concert in a chapter 9 or chapter 11 bankruptcy case.

《国家税务总局关于纳税人资产重组有关增值税问题的公告》(02/18/2011)

The State Administration of Taxation released the Announcement onIssues Concerning Value-Added Tax Relevant to Taxpayers’ Assets Restructuring (the “VAT Announcement”) on February 18, 2011. The effective date of the Announcement is March 1, 2011.

A recent Supreme Court judgement has confirmed that where an individual, Mr X, acts as director of company A, and company A is the sole director of company B, that will not necessarily make Mr X a “de facto” director of company B.

The Court decided that the mere fact of acting as a director of a corporate director was not enough to render the individual a de-facto director, “something more” would be required, such as the director holding himself out in correspondence as a director of company B.

Rainy Sky SA et al v Kookmin Bank [2010] All ER (D) 255 (May) In our Spring 2010 e-news we reported on the case of Kookmin Bank which dealt with the interpretation of a refund guarantee between Kookmin Bank (the “Bank”) and the customer of an insolvent shipyard. The Bank issued a refund guarantee to secure obligations assumed by its customer Jinse Shipbuilding (the “Builder”). The agreement required the Bank to repay on demand all of the instalments paid by the buyer, Rainy Sky, on the occurrence of a default event under the refund guarantee.

Section 113 of the Housing Grants, Construction & Regeneration Act 1996 (the 1996 Act) outlaws pay when paid provisions, with one exception. It is permissible for a Contractor to use a pay when paid provision to deny payment of outstanding amounts due to its Sub-contractor where the Client at the top of the supply chain has gone bust. The general consensus is of course that this exception is unfair. It is essentially asking the Sub-contractors to act as insurers of both the main Contractor and Client insolvency.

On February 7, 2011, in In re DBSD North America, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit released its opinion joining the Third Circuit in condemning socalled “gifting plans,” thus deepening the perceived circuit split with the First Circuit which has been interpreted as approving of gifting plans. In so doing, the Second Circuit relied on the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship2 and Norwest Bank Worthington v.

The current "Great Recession," which began in late 2007 with a maelstrom in the debt capital markets, has necessitated a rethinking of the federal income tax rules governing debt restructurings. The harsh rules2 promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in reaction to the 1991 taxpayer-favorable decision in Cottage Savings v. Commissioner,3 have been inhibiting restructurings. Instead, rules that did not trigger adverse tax results have been needed to induce lenders and borrowers to restructure obligations that can no longer be paid according to their terms.

Case considering whether rent which accrued during an administration was payable in full as an expense of the administration or whether payment was a matter of discretion for the court.

R (on the application of Global Knafaim Leasing Ltd and another) v. Civil Aviation Authority and another