A collective sigh of relief was the main effect of this week’s much-awaited Supreme Court decision on bankruptcy jurisdiction in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935, ___ U.S.___ (May 26, 2015, Sotomayor, J.). While a number of minor issues remain, the majority’s ruling that bankruptcy judges can issue judgments and final orders with the parties’ consent means that the current bankruptcy system can continue to function normally.

Section 42 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6) (“BO”) provides that where a person is adjudged bankrupt, any disposition of property made by that person from the date of presentation of the bankruptcy petition is void unless made with the consent of the Court or unless subsequently ratified by the Court. The purpose of this section is to prevent the improper dissipation of the bankrupt’s assets once a bankruptcy petition is filed and to protect the principle of pari passu distribution.

In a little-noticed November opinion, the Seventh Circuit greatly expanded the ability of a bankruptcy trustee to avoid a security interest for documentation errors under section 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.  See State Bank of Toulon v. Covey (In re Duckworth), 776 F.3d 453 (7th Cir. 2014).

Last week’s Supreme Court arguments on bankruptcy jurisdiction in Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935 (S.Ct.), are enough to strike fear into the heart of any bankruptcy buff. What emerges from the transcript of the oral arguments is, in a word, confusion. This bodes ill for an early resolution of the upheaval created by the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011), limiting the power of bankruptcy judges to decide certain matters that arise in bankruptcy proceedings.

More than seven years is a long time to wait for a loaned painting to be returned. But after such a long wait, Sandro Botticelli’s Madonna and Child (1485) is being returned to its owner, Kraken Investments Limited (Kraken).   Kraken had consigned the painting to a gallery for sale, but the gallery’s bankruptcy intervened.

Introduction: the New Guidelines in the Context of the State Aid Modernization Program

Plans of Adjustment were confirmed recently in each of the landmark Detroit, MI and Stockton, CA bankruptcy cases. Although both cases shared many common legal issues, they took different paths to reach confirmation. Detroit, which resolved its cases by entering into settlements with its major constituents, provides a potential roadmap for future cases but only limited judicial guidance. Stockton provides more judicial precedent. For municipalities and their creditors, however, the lessons learned from the two cases will surely influence future Chapter 9 proceedings.

Section 30A(1) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6) (the “BO”), provides that the bankruptcy period, for a person who has been adjudged bankrupt for the first time, runs for four years. However, section 30A(4) of the BO provides eight grounds upon which the Court, on the application of the trustee in bankruptcy or a creditor, can order the suspension of a bankruptcy period – in effect lengthening the period of bankruptcy.

It’s always risky when the Supreme Court grants certiorari in a bankruptcy case. While the Court’s opinion may bring clarity to the narrow question upon which certiorari was granted, it often creates a host of unintended problems in other areas.

Judge Drain’s recent decision confirming the Momentive Performance Materials Inc. plan is just the latest in a series of recent cases involving “make whole” premiums. As in several of the recent cases, the lenders lost because the contract did not clearly enough provide for the make whole premium in the event of an acceleration rather than prepayment.