A bankruptcy court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to determine a tax refund claim under Section 505(a)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code where the refund was requested by a liquidating trustee appointed pursuant to a plan, as opposed to a pre-confirmation bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Bond, Docket No. 12-4803 (2nd Cir. Aug. 13, 2014).
The recent case of APCOA Parking1 has set a precedent by allowing yet more non-English incorporated debtors to implement financial and corporate restructurings using English schemes of arrangement.
Hopes that certain severance payments paid by companies to terminated employees could escape application of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax were dashed when a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 25th that such payments, when not tied to state unemployment benefits, were “wages,” and thus taxable. The ruling for the government will allow the IRS to disallow protective refund claims that numerous companies filed after a federal circuit court held that termination payments were not subject to FICA tax.
On March 4, 2014, a unanimous United States Supreme Court decided Law v. Siegel1 and clarified that exercising statutory or inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory authority. Law will likely have broad implications for business bankruptcy cases even though it directly involved the exercise of a bankruptcy judge’s authority under section 105(a) to create a pragmatic solution to the actions of a bad actor in a consumer bankruptcy case.
Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code limits the ability of a trustee or debtor-in-possession to avoid as a constructive fraudulent transfer or preferential transfer a transaction in which the challenged settlement payment was made through a stockbroker or a financial institution.1 Because of the broad protection granted by section 546(e) – the so-called “safe harbor” provision – parties structuring a leveraged buyout (“LBO”) or similar transaction often ensure that settlement funds flow through one of the listed institutions to inoculate the beneficiaries from a later challenge as a constr
A recent decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has added an additional eligibility requirement for the filing of Chapter 15 cases. In Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 6482499 (2d Cir.
One of the effects of commercial globalization is that the bankruptcy filing of a debtor with transnational business relationships will sometimes result in a clash between the substantive bankruptcy laws of different countries. A frequent question is whether the bankruptcy laws of a foreign country should be brought to bear upon creditors located in the United States, even where foreign bankruptcy law is at odds with the laws of the United States.
In a decision that demonstrates the potentially broad impact of the forthcoming Supreme Court decision in Bellingham, the Fifth Circuit held that bankruptcy judges may not “determine” non-core matters even where the parties consent. BP RE, L.P. v. RML Waxahachie Dodge, L.L.C. (In re BP RE, L.P.), No. 12-51270 (5th Cir. Nov. 11, 2013), see Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkinson (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), 702 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted 133 S.Ct. 2880 (2013) (set for oral argument January 14, 2014).
Adding to the split of authority that has developed since the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011), in Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 12-1349 (Aug. 21, 2013), the 7th Circuit aligned with the 6th Circuit’s decision in Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910 (6th Cir. 2012), to hold that a party may not consent or waive objection to the limited Constitutional authority of an Article I bankruptcy court.