In the wake of the high profile collapse of the private equity firm Abraaj Capital, the Dubai International Financial Centre (“DIFC”) updated its insolvency regime with the introduction on June 13, 2019 of the new DIFC Insolvency Law (Law No.1 of 2019) (the “DIFC Insolvency Law”).

Disagreeing with the much-critiqued SDNY opinion in Enron, the SDNY bankruptcy court disallowed claims brought by secondary transferees because the original claimants allegedly received millions of dollars in fraudulent transfers and preferences from the Debtors that have not been repaid. Deepening the district spilt on the nature of Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that the defense barring fraudulent transfer-tainted claims focuses on claims—not claimants—and cannot be “washed clean” by a subsequent transfer in the secondary market.

With the significant strain placed on market participants as a result of the combined impacts of the global COVID-19 pandemic, the oil price war and the ensuing liquidity and credit crunches, we expect that a number of enterprises in the United Arab Emirates ("UAE") will either be forced to carry out restructurings or otherwise undergo formal court-supervised insolvency processes.

Directors will soon be free to make decisions to trade on even insolvent entities, and incur debts in the ordinary course of business, with the passing of the Coronavirus Economic Response Package Omnibus Act 2020 last night and Royal Assent today. The Act is intended to encourage business to continue trading free of risk that insolvent trading laws – which prevent directors of insolvent companies incurring fresh debt – would impose a personal civil and criminal liability on them. There are also changes to statutory demands and debtor's petitions.

ASIC is becoming more serious and more active and will take action against directors if there is su cient reason to, so insolvency practitioners should consider all possible actions/recoveries fully in any report to ASIC. 

A company's financial distress presents a challenge for its directors and officers of large and complex financial services companies and can raise a range of difficult issues, including potential liability for insolvent trading, which potentially exposes directors both to civil and criminal consequences under the Corporations Act 2001(Cth).

Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan generally requires the consent of each impaired class of creditors. A debtor can “cramdown” a plan over creditor dissent, however, as long as at least one class of impaired claims accepts the plan.

The consequences of an order or judgement being final or interlocutory are enormous. An order from an interlocutory order requires leave since these orders are not appealable as of right. In addition, a failure to obtain leave may result in the issue becoming moot. This is especially so when motions to lift the stay are involved: if the motion is denied and is not immediately appealable, by the time the case is concluded, the issues will most likely be moot.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently held in In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, No. 13-3992-cv (L) (2d Cir., Dec. 19, 2019) that Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e) barred claims seeking to avoid payments made by Tribune to its shareholders as part of a leveraged buyout (LBO).

Yes, says the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit recently held that the Bankruptcy Court has the authority to confirm a chapter 11 plan which contains nonconsensual, third-party releases when such releases are integral to the successful reorganization. The court’s decision in In re Millennium holds that, when the third-party releases are integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship, the Bankruptcy Court has the constitutional authority to approve nonconsensual, third-party releases.

Background