Essentially all securitization structures utilize a bankruptcy remote entity, a/k/a special purpose entity (“SPE”), to reduce the lenders’ or investors’ exposure to a bankruptcy of the sponsor. A standard feature of SPEs is the appointment of an independent person (director, member, manager) to the body managing the SPEs. That independent person’s consent is required for “major decisions,” one of which is the filing of, or consenting to a bankruptcy of the SPE (hence the court’s reference to them as “blocking directors”).

You know, there’s never a dull moment when one reports on the regulatory states’ endless and so often fruitless and wrong-headed tinkering with the global economy. So now… let’s talk bail-in.

A recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation,¹ represents a significant victory for shareholders who may get cashed out in connection with a leveraged transaction that precedes a company bankruptcy.

SEC and FDIC Propose Dodd-Frank Broker-Dealer Resolution Rules

Two recent court decisions may affect an equity sponsor’s options when deciding whether and how to put money into - or take money out of - a portfolio company. The first may expand the scope of “inequitable conduct” that, in certain Chapter 11 settings, could lead a court to equitably subordinate a loan made by a sponsor to its portfolio company, placing the loan behind all of the company’s other debt in the payment queue. The second decision muddies the waters of precedent under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on the issue of the avoidability of non-U.S.

An overvalued property may now have a bigger impact on a secured creditor’s bottom-line during bankruptcy.  Splitting with the Seventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit in Southwest Securities, FSB v.

Two recent court decisions may result in a broadening of the range of options available to an equity sponsor in respect of an insolvent portfolio company. The first decision may provide increased flexibility in structuring asset sales in certain chapter 11 settings, by utilizing escrows and other techniques to potentially avoid the need to apply asset-sale proceeds strictly in accordance with creditor priorities under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

It is a basic feature of sales under section 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, that the purchaser takes free and clear of all claims and interests, such claims and interests attach to the proceeds of the sale in accordance with their priorities.

When a portfolio company underperforms, a sponsor may consider various options to address the perceived performance issues, including changes to a portfolio company’s management team, cost structure, capital structure or other parameters, depending on the nature of the issue(s) at hand. When changes in capital structure may be desirable, often in the context of excessive debt and related liquidity issues, a sponsor’s choices may include a consensual workout outside of bankruptcy, or a court-supervised restructuring under Chapter 11 of the U.S.

Bankruptcy courts in the U.S. are widely viewed as favorable fora for debtors, trustees and creditors’ committees to pursue creative and difficult causes of actions against deep-pockets lenders and others in an attempt to augment the resources available for distributions to creditors. In yet another case, however, the District Court for the Southern District of New York (after withdrawing the litigation from the bankruptcy court), recently dismissed many of the claims asserted by the Lehman debtors against J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.