U.S. courts generally agree that the substantive consolidation should be applied sparingly, and even more so when substantive consolidation of debtors with non-debtors is sought. While many opinions address the grounds for substantive consolidation, very few cases address standing and notice issues when the sought for consolidation is of non-debtor entities. The Oklahoma bankruptcy court recently addressed these two issues in SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Stewart.
Under section 1111(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, a non-recourse secured creditor that holds “a claim secured by a lien on property of the estate” is granted recourse against the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. But what happens when there has been a post-petition foreclosure on such property, so that it is no longer part of the estate and the liens have been extinguished? Can the creditor still use section 1111(b) to assert a claim against the bankruptcy estate? The Ninth Circuit answered no in Matsan v.
On April 24, 2017, the Alberta Court of Appeal issued a decision in Orphan Well Association v Grant Thornton Limited, 2017 ABCA 124. The decision is arguably the past year’s most hotly anticipated and discussed decision in Alberta, despite involving bankruptcy proceedings of a relatively small junior oil and gas company. The Court of Appeal, in a 2-1 split, upheld the trial judge’s decision that a receiver can disclaim or renounce uneconomic assets that are subject to costly environmental liabilities.
The Court of Appeal of Ontario found in Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Konga that the interpretation of a guarantee is a question of mixed fact and law, entitled to deference on appeal. Further, for a guarantor to obtain a discharge from the guarantee, he must establish that the bank's demand caused the debtor's default.
Recent Developments in Acquisition Finance
A U.S. House of Representatives Bill would amend the Bankruptcy Code to establish new provisions to address the special issues raised by troubled nonbank financial institutions.
The Lightstream decision confirms that Canadian courts have the jurisdiction under the CCAA to both: (i) incorporate and apply the oppression remedy; and (ii) where appropriate, when oppressive conduct has occurred, grant an order requiring a corporation to issue additional securities. However, such jurisdiction is limited and defined by the scheme and purpose of the CCAA.
In Re Lightstream Resources Ltd, 2016 ABQB 665 (Lightstream), the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta (Court) confirmed that it had jurisdiction to remedy oppressive conduct while a business is restructuring under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA). The decision also provides insight as to when a court might exercise its equitable jurisdiction to remedy oppressive conduct in a CCAA proceeding.
Background
In a highly anticipated bankruptcy opinion, the United States Supreme Court, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., held that courts may not approve structured dismissals providing for distributions that deviate from the priority rules prescribed in the Bankruptcy Code, absent consent of the affected creditors.
Companies that the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) believes may be subject to FDIC receivership under the Orderly Liquidation Authority contained in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, and certain of their affiliates, are now subject to recordkeeping requirements related to their “qualified financial contracts”1 (QFCs).