Legislative changes in Singapore and the EU introduce pre-insolvency processes facilitating non-consensual debt restructurings or cram downs comparable to those already available in London and New York. In particular, the EU Recast Insolvency Regulation (the "Recast Regulation") came into effect on June 26, 2017, enhancing cross-border co-operation for applicable insolvency proceedings starting in the EU after that date.*

98% of the liabilities of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) (“LBIE”) were denominated in non-sterling currencies. The fall in sterling after LBIE entered administration resulted in significant paper losses for creditors, which they sought to recover from the LBIE estate. The recent decision of the UK Supreme Court in Waterfall I refused to recognize such claims.*

The existing insolvency rules in the UK have been recast with the aim to "modernize and consolidate" the procedural framework for insolvency processes in the UK and promote efficiency. The Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016 (the “New Rules”) came into force on April 6, 2017.

A key feature of the New Rules is a welcome overhaul of the provisions regarding communication with creditors, to allow for electronic communications instead of paper documents and physical meetings.

In order to file for bankruptcy in the United States, a company needs to secure the appropriate corporate authorizations as required by its governing documents. What happens when a debtor does not obtain appropriate authorization to file its bankruptcy case? Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of West Virginia held in In re Tara Retail Group, LLC that an improper bankruptcy filing can be ratified when those who are required to authorize the filing remain silent.

Background

On July 16, 2014, the Uniform Law Commission (the “Commission”) approved a series of changes to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the “UFTA”). The UFTA had previously been adopted by most states in the country, including Michigan. The Commission’s amendments included changing the name of the law from the UFTA to the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (the “UVTA”).

What happens in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case when a creditor files a proof of claim involving a debt for which the statute of limitations to collect the debt has run? More specifically, does the filing of such a claim violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the “Act”)? That’s the issue considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in its recent decision in the case of Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson. 1

U.S. courts generally agree that the substantive consolidation should be applied sparingly, and even more so when substantive consolidation of debtors with non-debtors is sought. While many opinions address the grounds for substantive consolidation, very few cases address standing and notice issues when the sought for consolidation is of non-debtor entities. The Oklahoma bankruptcy court recently addressed these two issues in SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Stewart.

Under section 1111(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, a non-recourse secured creditor that holds “a claim secured by a lien on property of the estate” is granted recourse against the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. But what happens when there has been a post-petition foreclosure on such property, so that it is no longer part of the estate and the liens have been extinguished? Can the creditor still use section 1111(b) to assert a claim against the bankruptcy estate? The Ninth Circuit answered no in Matsan v.

In a recent decision, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit (the “Court”) considered the issue of asset “abandonment” in a Chapter 7 case[1]. The Court reversed the bankruptcy court’s decision to allow the Chapter 7 trustee to compromise a claim that the debtor argued the trustee had abandoned.

Background

In the case of Susan G. Brown v. Douglas Ellmann [1], the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (the “Sixth Circuit”) recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision to deny a Chapter 7 debtor’s proposed exemptions for the value of redemption rights she enjoyed under Michigan law related to the sale of a property she surrendered to the bankruptcy estate.

Background