The European Commission (EC) announced proposals on 22 November 2016, which are intended to harmonise national insolvency laws across the EU through a proposed directive “on preventative restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures” (Directive). The Directive will need to be passed by the European Council and European Parliament. Then, EU Member States would be required to adopt the Directive’s provisions into their respective national laws within two years from the date of its entry into force.
The Barton doctrine (named after the U.S. Supreme Court case Barton v. Barbour, 104 US 126 (1881)), generally prohibits suits against receivers and bankruptcy trustees in forums other than the appointing courts, absent appointing court's permission. It applies to suits that involve actions done in the officers' official capacity and within their authority as officers of the court.
The Bankruptcy Code gives a trustee the power to avoid pre-petition fraudulent and preference transfers made by a debtor, except that a trustee may not avoid a transfer that is "made by or to (or for the benefit of)" a party enumerated in 546(e) of the Code "in connection with a securities contract." Although 546(e) has been applied in various circumstances, there is little court guidance on whether 546(e) protects transfers made to repay commercial mortgage-backed securities ("CMBS") loans. One case in particular has applied 546(e) to dismiss such an avoidance action: Krol v.
Circuit held that when a chapter 11 debtor cures a default under its loan agreements, the debtor is required to pay default interest as required by the loan documents, rather than at the non-default rate.
In Princeton Office Park, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy and district court rulings that the purchaser of a NJ tax sale certificate forfeited its claim and lien because it included the premium it paid to the State when it purchased the tax certificate.
Burr & Forman lawyers won a significant victory in the Eleventh Circuit earlier this month. In the case In re: David A. Failla, — F.3d — (2016), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that a person who agrees to “surrender” his house in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) may not oppose the creditor’s foreclosure action in state court. Our firm was one of the first to advance this argument, and many, but not all, of the bankruptcy judges in Florida agreed with our interpretation of surrender under the bankruptcy code and related case law.
Key points:
While DIP Lenders rightfully negotiate for super-priority administrative expenses which trump post conversion chapter 7 administrative expenses, these provisions are not uniformly enforced.
DIP Lenders should require the inclusion of specific language providing that section 364(c)(1) super-priority claims have priority over chapter 7 administrative expense claims, including those to be incurred by a chapter 7 trustee above the agreed upon “burial expenses.”
On October 11, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States granted cert in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, No. 16-348 (Oct. Term 2016) to resolve a split among the Circuits as to the FDCPA’s prohibition against deceptive collection practices in the context of filing proofs of claim for debts where a collection action would otherwise be time-barred.
A substantive non-consolidation opinion is a common feature of structured finance transactions in the U.S. Most, if not all, opine as to what a bankruptcy court would do, but express no opinion on the appellate process. We would venture a guess that most opinion recipients assume that if the bankruptcy court gets it wrong, their rights will be vindicated on appeal. The Eighth Circuit opinion in Opportunity Finance1 casts a troubling shadow over that assumption.
Background
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that a Creditor Exclusion provision in D&O insurance coverage may result in significant limitations on the coverage provided to the D&Os, when the underlying dispute is with a creditor in its capacity as such.