A recent Delaware bankruptcy court decision may potentially place at risk an equity sponsor’s ability to retain proceeds from the sale of a portfolio company whose performance later deteriorates, where the selling sponsor acted in bad faith and the portfolio company was or became insolvent at the time of or on account of the sale.
Circuit Break? Delaware Bankruptcy Court Rejects Second Circuit Ruling on State Law Fraudulent Transfers
On July 14, 2016, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that the restructuring of a planned $1.5 billion transaction between Tullett Prebon Group Ltd. (Tullett Prebon) and ICAP plc adequately addresses the DOJ’s concerns that the transaction would violate Section 8 of the Clayton Act by creating an interlocking directorate. The parties restructured their transaction after the DOJ issued a Second Request to adequately investigate the parties post-closing ownership structure.
In FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP,1 the Seventh Circuit recently held that transfers are not protected under the safe harbor of section 546(e) of the U.S.
In a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the General Motors case, the court held certain claimants were not afforded procedural due process with respect to the § 363 sale of General Motor Corporation’s assets in the bankruptcy case. As a result, the assets were not sold free and clear of these claims, and these claimants may now seek recovery against New GM.
Private equity sponsors should be aware of two recent court decisions. One involves fiduciary duties under state law that may be owing to a limited liability company borrower by its managers, in the context of receivables financing facilities or other asset-based lending transactions involving the use of special-purpose vehicles. The other involves certain implications of governing-law choices under acquisition financing and related agreements.
Pottawattamie: Maybe Not So Special (Purpose) After All
In a 5-2 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States in Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al. v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust et al., 579 U.S. ___ (2016), rejected the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (the “Recovery Act”) as preempted by the Bankruptcy Code on June 13, 2016. The practical implication of the decision is that Puerto Rico is currently without options to restructure its billions of dollars in municipal debt, and the only feasible path forward will most likely have to come from Congress.
The Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System (Board) recently proposed a rule (Proposed Rule) that will impact parties to any "qualified financial contract" (QFC), as described below, with a global systemically important banking organization (GSIB) or a GSIB affiliate (together, a covered entity). The Proposed Rule will eliminate certain contractual rights with respect to the QFC when:
the covered entity counterparty is placed in a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) receivership; or
Addressing a novel issue in In re: International Oil Trading Company, LLC, 548 B.R. 825 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2016), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently denied in part an involuntary debtor’s motion to compel production of communications between the judgment creditor who had filed the involuntary bankruptcy petition and the petitioner’s litigation funder. The Court found that the attorney-client privilege and work product protection were applicable to certain disclosures made to the litigation funder, a non-lawyer third-party.
Essentially all securitization structures utilize a bankruptcy remote entity, a/k/a special purpose entity (“SPE”), to reduce the lenders’ or investors’ exposure to a bankruptcy of the sponsor. A standard feature of SPEs is the appointment of an independent person (director, member, manager) to the body managing the SPEs. That independent person’s consent is required for “major decisions,” one of which is the filing of, or consenting to a bankruptcy of the SPE (hence the court’s reference to them as “blocking directors”).