The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – a provision which, in effect, prohibits confirmation of a plan unless the plan has been accepted by at least one impaired class of claims – applies on “per plan” rather than a “per debtor” basis, even when the plan at issue covers multiple debtors. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 2018 WL 615431 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). The Court is the first circuit court to address the issue.

Hughes v Pluton Resources Ltd [2017] WASCA 213

This case concerned the application of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) (the PPSA) to funds held by a company in liquidation following the termination of a DOCA. In the course of its decision, the Court considered the meaning of various provisions of the PPSA, including:

Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.

Introduction

Does a potential administrator’s involvement in pre-administration contingency planning give rise to a conflict of interest, such that the potential administrator should be disqualified from accepting the formal appointment?

Korda, in the matter of Ten Network Holdings Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2017] FCA 914

Seeking directions from the Court in the period 1 March to 1 September 2017 – what are liquidators and administrators to do?

Justice Robson has delivered his decision on an application by receivers and managers for directions as to, among other things, their obligations to pay preferential debts under the Corporations Act from the surplus generated by their trading-onof a business and other recoveries by their appointing bank.

Is a “stay of enforcement” of a judgment within the meaning of s 15(2) of the Foreign Judgments Act brought about by s 58(3) of the Bankruptcy Act?

Talacko v Bennett [2017] HCA 15, 3 May 2017

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

As noted in a previous post about the Sakr case[1], the worth of the work done by a liquidator can be calculated in various