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Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.

Twenty years of straight-line growth for e-commerce and online shopping has created fortunes for technology investors, savings for consumers and vast efficiencies for a new and constantly evolving ecosystem of suppliers and supply chains. Traditional brick-and-mortar outlets (and the retail chains that own

them) are struggling to adapt to this new dimension of competition. The

relationship between e-commerce and traditional retail activity seems to have

reached a tipping point in the United States. 

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

Bondholders have long feared "the tyranny of the majority" and historically have found limited comfort in a provision of the Trust Indenture Act (the "TIA") that provides minority bondholders with a veto over proposed legal modifications to core payment terms. In the immediate wake of the Second Circuit's recent decision in Marblegate Asset Management v.

On January 17, 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its long-anticipated opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp., 1 ruling that Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (the “Act”), prohibits only non-consensual amendments to core payment terms of bond indentures.

On August 2, 2016, the IRS issued proposed regulations taking aim at valuation discounts with respect to closely-held interests for gift, estate and generation-skipping transfer tax purposes. If adopted, even with clarifying language, the proposed regulations will impact certain estate planning strategies.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.1  The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles.  GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi

On Sunday, May 1st, Energy Future Holdings Corp. (“EFH”) filed a new joint chapter 11 plan of reorganization and disclosure statement (the “New Plan”) after plans to fund EFH’s exit from bankruptcy by selling its Oncor power distribution business failed.

BACKGROUND

On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it.  The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code.  In In re Tribune Co.

In the high-profile bankruptcy case of Energy Future Holdings Corp. (“EFH”) a Delaware bankruptcy court recently called into question reliance on structural subordination as a way to protect a borrower’s assets from satisfying claims against an affiliated company. In the EFH bankruptcy case, holders of unsecured PIK notes issued by EFH subsidiary Energy Future Intermediate Holdings Company LLC (“EFIH”) sought to collect post-petition interest at the rate stated in the notes issued by EFIH.